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I. Introduction 
Just prior to the Republican Party’s sweeping electoral victory in November 2002, 
President George W. Bush suggested a new method for handling judicial appointments to 
address the problem of confirmation delay in the U.S. Senate.2 President Bush, in his 
proposal, suggested that district and circuit court judges would notify the president of 
their intention to retire at least one year in advance.3 The president would then submit a 
nomination within 180 days of receiving notice of the vacancy.4 The Senate Judiciary 
Committee would have 90 days from submission to conduct a hearing, and the full Senate 
would vote on each nominee within 180 days of submission.5 President Bush’s stated 
intent was to “fix, on a permanent and bipartisan basis, a judicial confirmation process 
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2that is clearly broken.”6 Ironically, even the President’s intent was called into question 
by Senator Patrick J. Leahy, then-Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, who 
complained that the proposal itself sought to “politicize” the judicial selection process to 
“create a partisan campaign issue” in the imminent November 2002 elections.7
Over the last several years, individuals receiving appointments to the federal 
judiciary have experienced significant delays in confirmation proceedings.8 These 
confirmation proceeding delays have led many commentators to criticize the United 
States Senate on its inefficiency in the judicial confirmation process.9 Even more 
significantly, these delays led former Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, in a report on 
the state of the judiciary in 1998, to rebuke the United States Senate for its “serious 
delays in the appointment process”.10 
The root of the current confirmation delay crisis lies in a series of political 
skirmishes over judicial appointments that occurred in the early 1980’s when President 
Ronald Reagan nominated a number of conservative judges to the bench.11 At that time, 
liberal advocacy groups persuaded Senate Democrats to scrutinize, and even block, the 
nominations of conservative judges.12 
This phenomenon occurred frequently in the late-1980’s and early-1990’s, as 
Senate Democrats utilized these tactics to reject the nomination of Robert Bork to the 
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3Supreme Court and to threaten the nomination of now-confirmed Supreme Court Justice 
Clarence Thomas.  The trend of blocking federal court nominations continued throughout 
the 1990’s; however, instead of Senate Democrats blocking the nominations, it was 
Senate Republicans, whom had taken control of the Senate, that blocked the nomination 
of a number of liberal judicial appointments submitted by the Clinton White House.13 
The delays in the confirmation process during the 1980’s and 1990’s had, 
according to a 1998 report issued by Chief Justice Rehnquist, taken a toll on the federal 
judiciary as these delays were adversely affecting the quality of justice.14 He noted in his 
report that one out of ten federal judgeships were vacant, with 26 posts being vacant for 
more than eighteen months.15 
Since Justice Rehnquist issued his report, judicial confirmation process delays 
have continued.  Indeed, Senate Democrats, who regained control of the Senate in the 
spring of 2001, have delayed a number of President George W. Bush’s judicial 
nominations.    
This article explores the process that has been established by Congress to confirm 
judicial nominees, denotes the reasons for delays in current confirmation proceedings, 
and offers a statistical analysis of demographic or political factors that affect the number 
of days required to confirm a judicial nominee.   
First, this article in Section II examines the process by which Congress confirms 
judicial nominees.  This section also discusses the varying delays that have arisen in 
judicial confirmation proceedings.   Second, this article in Sections III, IV, and V 
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4statistically evaluates judicial appointments.  Section III of this article analyzes 614 
district court appointments made between 1985 and 2000. Section IV looks at 362 circuit 
court appointments since from 1961 to 2000.  Last, Section V examines all 110 Supreme 
Court appointments between 1789 and 2000.16 
II. Appointing and Confirming Judicial Nominations 
This section surveys the history of the appointments process, and its evolution 
into a tenacious political battle ground over the last twenty years.  This section provides 
an in-depth analysis of the political wrangling that faced former Presidents Ronald 
Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Bill Clinton, as well as the early politicking that 
impacted President George W. Bush’s consideration of judicial appointments. 
A. The History of the Appointments Process 
The United States Constitution provides that the President shall have the power to 
nominate district court judges, circuit court judges, and Supreme Court Justices.17 The 
Constitution also provides that the Senate shall have the right to both advise the President 
on judicial choices and to consent to the President’s ultimate judicial nominations.18 
However, the question that always seems to exist is: how much power should each side 
have?   
On one hand, Alexander Hamilton opined in The Federalist No. 66 that “[t]here 
will, of course, be no exertion of CHOICE on the part of the Senate.”19 On the other 
 
16 Sections III, IV, and V analyze data through December 2000 at the close of Bill Clinton’s second term as 
President. 
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5hand, during the nation’s first 100 years, the U.S. Senate exercised its consent powers 
politically and rejected one quarter of the Presidents’ choices for the Supreme Court.20 
Accordingly, with the United States Senate willing to assert its will, the 
President’s appointment power rests largely on his ability to negotiate.21 Presidents, with 
few exceptions,22 have generally delegated their negotiating powers to various high-level 
government officials.23 
Presidents and their high-level judicial appointments teams’ negotiating powers 
rely on their ability to bargain with members of Congress.  Indeed, as one commentator 
has noted: 
 
To get their way, presidents have to negotiate with ostensible 
allies, with the result that presidents have far less power to see their will 
done than might be supposed.  The mechanics of the appointment process 
have some affect on the ultimate decision to appoint, but not much.  In 
most cases, presidents get what they want only to the extent that they are 
willing to accommodate the interests of a state’s senators . . ..  FDR, at one 
end of the spectrum, would negotiate with senators and party.  
Eisenhower, at the other, would not, leaving the Justice Department to 
protect his interests.24 
20 Id.  This included one of George Washington’s nominees for chief justice. 
21 Id. 
22 For instance, President Franklin Roosevelt understood the appointments process and was exceptionally 
involved, even in the negotiation process.  Sheldon Goldman, Picking Federal Judges 15-64 (1997). 
23 As one commentator has noted, Presidents Truman through Reagan all delegated their judicial 
appointment powers.  Id. at 1-14.  Specifically, the commentator noted: 
Harry Truman delegated the appointment chore, interjecting himself only occasionally.  Dwight 
Eisenhower was even further removed from the process, having given it over to his attorney 
general.  As his administrations wore on, however, he wanted to be more involved in the process 
and asked his staff to prepare memorandums to explain how it worked.  But he never felt 
comfortable enough to exert authority.  John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, treated as one 
extended administration here, delegated the process to their attorneys general, although each was 
interested in stepping in when the need arose to secure particular appointments.  Richard Nixon, 
Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and [Ronald] Reagan followed the pattern of delegation and general 
lack of micro-management. 
24 Id. A key to any nominee’s success in the process is the strength of his or her political connections. 
6If a President does not want to negotiate with members of the Senate, the Senate 
may then thwart the nomination in any number of ways.  Particularly, either the judiciary 
committee or the full Senate may reject the appointment by vote.   
However, there are other ways in which the Senate can ensure that a judicial 
selection is not confirmed.  A U.S. Senator, whether from the President’s party or not, 
may effectively block a nominee in two ways.25 First, the U.S. Senator can issue a secret 
“hold” on a potential appointment.26 This “hold” operates to indefinitely block the 
nominee’s confirmation vote.27 The U.S. Senator issuing the “hold” could, until recently, 
remain anonymous.28 Second, the nominee’s home-state U.S. Senator could fail to sign 
off on the “blue slip”.29 Before a nomination can proceed, both state Senators must sign a 
“blue slip”, and if they do not, then the nomination will never receive a vote in the 
judiciary committee.30 These delays are typically avoided if both senators from a state 
agree on a nominee.31 
Interestingly enough, over the years, the main hurdle in the appointments process 
has not involved getting an appointee past the Senate Judiciary Committee and obtaining 
the vote of the full Senate.32 Rather, confirmation problems have been the result of either 
 
25 Mikva, supra note 9, at 70.   
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White House Counsel from 1994-95. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
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30 Id.  
31 Id. 
32 Goldman, supra note 23, at 1-14. 
7the appointees’ home state Senators placing a “hold” on the nominee or failing to sign off 
on a “blue slip”.33 
One commentator, who has written extensively on this subject, summarized the 
negotiating process from a historical perspective as follows: 
The tension is always between the president’s goals and the 
senators’ goals.  The president has the best chance to put his own person 
on the bench when the nominee’s state has no senators of the president’s 
party.  The appointment power carries with it no obligation to defer to the 
other party’s senators, and, not surprisingly, presidents rarely consider the 
opposition’s interests.  Federal judgeships are the biggest political prizes 
and must be handed out to secure the greatest advantage.  Senators from 
the president’s own party, representing their particular state party 
organization, want to see their own people benefited, and they exercise 
whatever leverage they can to do so.  The power that the senators can 
exercise in the appointment process, especially if they sit on the Judiciary 
Committee, can lead to a stillborn nomination or even a defeated one.34 
B. The Appointments Process Over The Last Twenty Years 
The dynamics of the appointments process has changed dramatically over the last 
twenty years.  As one commentator noted, the Senate has begun to use: 
different justifications and techniques to block or at least slow down the 
president’s capacity to fill judicial vacancies.  Some attribute these 
partisan tactics to the 1987 “Borking” of President Reagan’s nomination 
of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court.  While the failed confirmation of 
Judge Bork (and the barely successful confirmation of Justice Clarence 
Thomas) were dramatic examples of Senate partisanship, the problems 
usually were confined to Supreme Court appointments.35 
Indeed, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Democratic controlled Senate, with the help 
of liberal special interest groups, began stalling and delaying the confirmation of a 
 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Mikva, supra note 9, at 70.  However, it should be noted, with regard to confirming Supreme Court 
Justices, that “[p]residents have had trouble with those ever since George Washington lost two of his early 
nominations to the Court because the Senate was irritated at the administration about some treaty.”  Id. 
8number of Republican Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush’s conservative 
nominations to the federal courts.   
1. The Clinton White House 
In the first two years of the Clinton administration, Democrats controlled both 
branches of Congress and the White House.  During this time, the Clinton White House 
appointed 129 judges.36 In 1994, the Republicans gained control of Congress, and they 
began engaging in stall and delay tactics whenever the Clinton White House presented 
them with liberal judicial appointments.37 
The Clinton White House and Senate Republicans struggled at first over the 
confirmation process.  Ultimately, the White House withdrew nine of its liberal 
nominations in the face of ardent opposition,38 and over the next two years, Republicans 
confirmed 73 of Clinton’s judicial nominations.39 
In a 1996 speech, U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), then chairman of the 
judiciary committee, explained and defended the Republican Congress’ desire to thwart 
the appointment of liberal judges.40 Senator Hatch stated:   
Now I am not saying that the Senate can or should use its advise 
and consent power to block all judicial appointees whose political views I 
do not agree with, to stop every nominee because a Republican president 
would not have made the same appointment, or because we want revenge 
for what happened to nominations proposed by Republican presidents.  As 
chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee during the past Congress, I 
 
36 Jonathan Ringel, GOP Senators Ready To Enter The Judge Game:  Bush In The White House Empowers 
Law Makers On Bench Recommendations, January 22, 2001. 24 Legal Times 6 (2001).  Throughout the 
Clinton years, 374 judges were appointed, and of those, 1/3 were appointed in his first two years in office.  
Id. 
37 Rehnquist scolds GOP for delay on judges, supra note 11.   
38 Schultz, supra note 20, at 58. 
39 U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch, Hatch Fires Warning Shot On Judges, November 18, 1996, 19 Legal Times 
14 (1996).   
40 Id. 
9sought to steer the nomination process in a way that kept it a fair and 
principled one, and I still plan to conduct a fair confirmation process.  But 
conducting a fair confirmation process most assuredly does not mean 
granting the president carte blanche in filling the federal judiciary.  It is as 
simple as this:  Those nominees who are or will be judicial activists should 
not be nominated by the President or confirmed by the Senate, and I will 
do my best to see to it that they are not.  Now, the president’s liberal 
constituency is chomping at the bit for President Clinton during his second 
term to pack the courts with liberal judicial activists.  I urge the president 
to resist that call.41 
By and large, the Clinton White House, during its second term, heeded Senator 
Hatch’s advice and steered away from nominating inordinate numbers of liberal judges.   
During the first three years of the Clinton White House’s second term, a vast 
majority of judicial nominations were confirmed.  However, the process was 
exceptionally political.  The Clinton White House encountered substantial politicking 
from both Democrats and Republicans.  Accordingly, some judicial nominations failed 
because the President and Senators could not come to terms via horse-trading on certain 
items.42 
At other times, judicial nominations failed simply because a Senator blocked the 
nomination.  For instance, one Senator placed a personal hold on a nominee to the 
District Court of his state simply because the nominee had voted for Clinton.43 The 
nominee was well regarded with the state bar and with a Republican senator.44 In another 
instance, a Senator refused to approve a nominee because of a discovery dispute he had 
suffered with the nominee while they were both practicing lawyers.45 
41 Id. 
42 Ringel, supra note 37, at 6. 
43 Mikva, supra note 9, at 70. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
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Finally, some nominees failed to receive confirmation votes because of blunders 
made by the Clinton administration.  For instance, Senator Spencer Abraham (R-Mich.) 
held up Helene White’s nomination to the 6th Circuit for 42 months because the White 
House failed to consult him prior to White’s nomination, and because of dissonance 
between himself and Michigan’s other U.S. Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.).46 
The Clinton administration might have avoided these problems by consulting with 
Senator Abraham, and by acting as a broker between Senators Abraham and Levin.  The 
Clinton administration could have suggested that the Senators agree to a selection process 
similar to that of Senators Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.) and Alfonse D’Amato (R-
N.Y.).  These senators, though of different parties, had agreed on a successful division of 
nomination powers that worked during Republican and Democratic administrations.47 
However, despite politicking and Senatorial holds, the Senate confirmed the vast 
majority of Clinton’s judicial nominees.  Indeed, entering into the last year of his 
Presidency, only 37 of Clinton’s federal bench nominees awaited confirmation, with only 
a few nominees having waited more than a year.48 
2. Transitioning From The Clinton White House To The George 
W. Bush White House: Fall 2000 – Spring 2001 
 
46 Id.   
47 Mikva, supra note 9, at 70.  Many senators, though of different parties, have worked out successful 
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are Republican, Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ), a member of the judiciary committee, negotiates with the state’s 
only Democrat, Rep. Ed Pastor (D-AZ), and jointly recommends judicial candidates to the White House.  
This cooperation, in light of a Democratic White House, worked well as all three of their 2000 nominations 
- Susan Ritchie Bolton, Mary Helen Murguia, and James Teilborg – were confirmed within days of their 
nominations. 
48 Id.  It is interesting to note that the judicial nominees whom have been waiting the longest are the least 
likely to receive confirmation.  Jonathan Ringel, Stay Tuned: End Game On Judge Nears, August 7, 2000, 
23 Legal Times 1 (2000).  For example, 11 of the last 12 judges approved by the Senate went from 
nomination to confirmation in under three months – this included three district court candidates from 
Arizona whom were voted out of the Senate Judiciary Committee just six days after they were nominated.  
11 
a. Clinton’s Lame Duck Appointments 
 
In the last year of the Clinton administration, the appointments process teetered 
along much the same as it had during the preceding three years, with one historically 
notable exception – Clinton continued to make judicial appointments during the fall 
election cycle.  Typically, during an election cycle, the Senate will not confirm judicial 
appointments.  This long-standing informal practice was formalized in June of 1960 
when then-Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson sent a letter to President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower informing him that the Senate would not confirm any more federal judges 
until after the November election.49 In so stating, Johnson reasoned that it would be 
improper for the president to appoint any “midnight” judges.50 
The LBJ letter has been followed over the years and, in that tradition, the 2000 
Republican Senate completed its confirmation proceedings in July of 2000.  However, the 
Clinton White House failed to observe tradition and unilaterally decided to make more 
judicial appointments just prior to Election Day.51 
Admittedly, the LBJ letter has not served as an automatic block to federal 
judicial appointments.  Indeed, some appointments have occurred in rare circumstances 
when both parties have agreed and supported an appointment.  For instance, current 
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer, who was nominated by President Jimmy Carter to 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit prior to the November 1980 election, was 
confirmed after the election.52 In this instance, Breyer, who had served as chief counsel 
 
49 Mikva, supra note 9, at 70.  
50 Id. 
51 Jonathan Groner, Bush May Need to Show Restraint In Judge Picks:  Even Split In Senate, Modest Mean 
Conservative Court May Face Confirmation Battles, November 13, 2000, 23 Legal Times 9 (2000). 
52 Id. 
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to the Judiciary Committee, had the support of the chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, Sen. Ted Kennedy (D-Mass), and the ranking minority member, Sen. Strom 
Thurmond (R-S.C.).53 
However, under most circumstances, judicial “midnight appointments” are not 
made, and the Clinton White House failed to observe this tradition by making 
appointments prior to the election.  Additionally, after the election, the Clinton White 
House continued to make appointments (known as recess appointments), including the 
nomination of Richmond attorney Roger Gregory to the Fourth Circuit.54 Republican 
Senators were outraged by these appointments because the Clinton White House had 
agreed not to make recess appointments, judicial or otherwise, without consulting Senate 
majority leaders.55 
Nevertheless, these last minute Clinton appointments presented the new Bush 
administration and an evenly divided Senate with a politically explosive appointment 
problem.  Such appointments are pending until President George W. Bush submits them 
to the Senate.  If President Bush chose not to forward these appointments, he risked 
angering Senate Democrats, who could then respond with increased opposition to Bush’s 
own judicial appointments.   
Interestingly enough, the Clinton administration was not required to make these 
appointments - there were no emergency reasons justifying the appointments and the 
 
53 Id. 
54 Jonathan Groner, Bush May Need to Show Restraint In Judge Picks:  Even Split In Senate, Modest Mean 
Conservative Court May Face Confirmation Battles, November 13, 2000, 23 Legal Times 9 (2000).  In 
November of 2000, prior to the December appointments, sixty-six vacancies remain from the Clinton years 
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55 Id.  One commentator likened these recess appointments as the equivalent of an obscene gesture directed 
at Congress. 
13 
administration did not consult with Senate Republican leaders prior to making them.  In 
fact, the Clinton administration had little to gain from these last minute appointments.   
The administration had already dramatically changed the composite of the federal 
judiciary by appointing 374 judges – almost 45 percent of the federal judiciary.56 
b. Transitioning To The George W. Bush White House 
President George W. Bush’s57 judicial team is composed of advisers well versed 
in the selection process.58 As one commentator has noted:  “‘This is not a new 
administration.  These are old pros.  They know how to play this game.’”59 
As such, the judicial appointments team’s first moves were to evaluate the 
appointments landscape from a political perspective and to announce a fairly radical 
change.  As to the change, the Bush White House removed the “ABA out of the formal 
role in the judicial nomination process it was given by President Dwight Eisenhower in 
1953”.60 Conservatives had criticized the ABA’s role in the judicial selection process for 
years, alleging that its selection criteria was weighted heavily in favor of liberal judicial 
selections. 
 
56 Ringel, supra note 49, at 1.  An academic study of the Clinton appointed judges shows that as a whole 
they are just a bit more liberal than the judges appointed by Gerald Ford.  Schultz, supra note 20, at 58. 
57 George W. Bush, as Texas governor, appointed four well-regarded, relatively non-ideological lawyers to 
the state’s highest court.  Jonathan Groner, Pro-Business But Still Independent:  The Bush Justices, October 
16, 2000, 23 Legal Times 1 (2000).  Bush also named 134 judges to state courts at all levels.  Bush’s 
judiciary choices are “judges’ judges,” meaning they tend to defer to the legislature rather than create new 
rights on their own.  These judges favor business interests but are not sure votes for big business.  These 
judges are independent thinkers and are willing to dissent.  They are also very diverse. 
58 Jim Oliphant, Tipping the Scales:  Circuit by Circuit – Bush Picks Would Shift Balance of Power on 
Several Pivotal Appellate Courts, May 14, 2001, 24 Legal Times 1 (2001). 
59 Id. (quoting law professor Herman Schwartz of American law school). 
60 Wheatley Aycock, From New Appointees and a War on Terror to Law Firm Layoffs: A Look Back,
December 24, 2001, 24 Legal Times 23 (2001).  Even though the ABA does not have a formal role, in June 
of 2001, they still submitted a ratings list to the Judiciary Committee. They approved of seven of Bush’s 
nominations. 
14 
Second, with respect to the political landscape, the Bush administration surveyed 
the political makeup of the Senate.  In the Senate, Republicans controlled both Senate 
seats in eighteen states, Democrats controlled both seats in eighteen states, with the 
remaining fourteen Senate delegations evenly split.61 In instances where Republicans 
controlled both Senate seats, the appointments process was expected to run smoothly as 
Senators were likely to arrange a way to share the judicial recommendation power.62 In 
the eighteen states where both senators were Democrats, the Bush administration 
solicited advice on potential nominees from a high-ranking Republican House members 
and/or the state’s Republican governor.63 Finally, in the fourteen States where the 
delegations were split, the Senators would be expected to devise a plan to share the 
nomination power.64 
Initially, the Senate, although split 50-50, was controlled by Republicans by virtue 
of Vice-President Dick Cheney’s role as the tie breaking vote; therefore, all committees, 
including the judiciary, were controlled by Republicans.  This gave Republicans in the 
judiciary committee a huge advantage as they controlled both the Senate and the White 
House at the same time.  It would have been the first time that Republicans had 
 
61 Jonathan Ringel, GOP Senators Ready To Enter The Judge Game:  Bush In The White House Empowers 
Law Makers On Bench Recommendations, January 22, 2001. 24 Legal Times 6 (2001). 
62 Id.  In Texas, for instance, Republican Sens. Phil Gramm and Kay Bailey Hutchison will rely on 
Gramm’s longtime 20-member judicial selection committee, downgraded to an “advisory group” during the 
Clinton years. 
63 Id.  For instance, in New York, Republican Rep. Benjamin Gilman, the state’s senior Republican in the 
House and Republican Gov. George Pataki will make judicial recommendations.  In Michigan, Republican 
Rep. Fred Upton and Republican Gov. George Engler will make judicial recommendations. (This will 
include three seats currently open on the 6th Circuit).  In Georgia, Republican Rep. John Linder will make 
judicial nominations. 
64 Id. In Iowa, Republican Sen. Charles Grassley will make the judicial selections, taking the reigns from 
Democratic Sen. Tom Harkin.  Meanwhile, in Indiana, Republican Sen. Richard Lugar will make the 
judicial selections, taking the reigns from Democratic Senator Evan Bayh.  Senator Lugar will have a 
steering team help select potential nominees.  Members of this team include a committee of lawyers, 
business people, and a minister to help pick federal judges. 
15 
simultaneously controlled both houses of Congress and the White House in the modern 
political era.   
However, the Republicans’ tenuous majority in the Senate did not last long.  In 
May 2001, Vermont Senator Jim Jeffords defected from the Republican Party – thus 
shifting control of the Senate to the Democrats.65 The political landscape changed 
dramatically as Jeffords’ Democratic colleague from Vermont, Senator Patrick Leahy, 
became chairman of the Judiciary Committee.66 The shift in power resulted in a 
Democratic controlled Senate and a Republican White House, which created the 
likelihood that the Judiciary Committee would again engage in stall and delay tactics, 
especially on conservative nominations. 
III. United States District Court Judge Confirmations Since 198567 
The preceding section discussed the appointments process and the political 
skirmishes that have occurred in the years leading up to the George W. Bush 
administration, including the political reasons for delays.  This section, as well as two 
that follow, statistically evaluate the reasons for appointments process delays, and assess 
certain individual characteristics or factors that tend to cause confirmation delays.  
Confirmation delays are most prevalent for nominations of judges for district 
court.  While the average confirmation time for Supreme Court Justices since 1789 is 
22.17 days (Table 1) and circuit court judges since 1961 have been confirmed in an 
 
65 Wheatley Aycock, From New Appointees and a War on Terror to Law Firm Layoffs: A Look Back,
December 24, 2001, 24 Legal Times 23 (2001). 
66 Id. 
67 The timeframe of 1985-2000 for district court judges was selected for two reasons.  First, a sample of just 
over 600 confirmations assures reliability to a margin of error of plus or minus 4%.  Second, such a 
timeframe allows examination of Presidential terms that were equally split between Republicans and 
Democrats (eight years each). 
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average of 75.70 days (Table 10), district court judges (since 1985) have taken an average 
of over 100 days to be confirmed.   
To analyze these delays and their suspected causes, 614 district court 
confirmations since 1985 have been examined.  As the following section explains, there 
are certain demographic and political factors that have a substantial effect on 
confirmation time for district court judges. 
A. Gender/Age/Ethnic Origin68 
The Senate takes a longer time confirming women than they do men.  As Table 21 
shows, women take an average of 120.30 days to be confirmed (Column C) while men 
are confirmed in 96.37 days (Column D).  In a theme that will repeat throughout this 
section, the data suggests that demographic traits that contribute to confirmation delay 
are becoming less influential, beginning at the district court level and working their way 
up through the judiciary.  For example, women only take 25% longer than men to 
confirm at the district court level while they take 50% longer at the circuit court level.69 
Confirmation delays related to age are statistically relevant for district court 
appointments.  Columns D through I of Table 21 suggest that confirmation delays based 
on age take on a traditional bell-curve distribution.  Confirmations of those judges under 
40 and those over 60 years of age at confirmation are confirmed most rapidly, while 
those judges in the midpoint age grouping of 46-50 take almost twice as long to confirm.  
One can only speculate that perhaps the rising young stars of the judiciary (as well as 
those long overdue for consideration) are confirmed on a fast track while the greatest 
 
68 Judges of the United States Courts, Federal Judiciary Center, available in <http://air.fjc.gov>.   
69 Since there have been only two women confirmed to the Supreme Court, it is still too early to tell (and 
the sample far too small) whether women as a class will be unduly delayed in confirmation to the Court. 
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scrutiny is reserved for those old enough to raise questions about their suitability (i.e., 
“Why weren’t they submitted sooner?”) yet young enough to create concern over their 
suitability for lifetime appointment. 
The most compelling example of the evolving nature of demographic influence on 
confirmation delay involves the ethnic origin of nominees.  At the Supreme Court level, 
it is noted that African-American nominees (albeit only two) had endured longer than 
normal delays in confirmation.  At the circuit court level, bias against African-American 
nominees has largely subsided in favor of extended confirmation delays for Hispanic 
judges.  This trend continues at the district court level.  As Columns J and K of Table 21 
illustrate, the confirmation times for Caucasian and African-American judges are 
practically identical (99.42 days and 101.99 days, respectively).  While Hispanic judges 
take approximately 15% longer to be confirmed (114.70 days – Column L), this 
discrepancy is far lower than at the circuit court level, where Hispanics take twice as long 
to be confirmed.  At the district court level, the ethnic group subjected to the most 
egregious delays are judges with Asian-American heritage.  These judges have taken an 
average of 213.20 days (Column M) to be confirmed – more than double all other 
nominees.70 
B. Law School Ranking71 
70 Note that there were only 5 Asian-Americans confirmed to district court posts between 1985 and 2001, 
with the confirmation of Susan O. Mollway taking 531 days.  Thus, it is possible that Judge Mollway’s 
lengthy confirmation has skewed the numbers for Asian-Americans as a whole.  But, as in the lengthy 
confirmation process for Judge Richard Paez to the Ninth Circuit, the bias against ethnic groups in the 
confirmation process is typically manifested by the extended confirmation of one or two early nominees for 
the affected ethnic group. 
71 Judges of the United States Courts, Federal Judiciary Center, available in <http://air.fjc.gov>.  (This site 
provided information on the law school attended by each judge.  In the case of judges with multiple law 
degrees, the first law degree obtained was used.  Law School Rankings were obtained from U.S. News & 
World Report, available in <http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/beyond/gradrank/law/gdlawt1.htm>). 
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Law school rankings are less important at the district court level than at any of the 
other levels analyzed in this Article.  Interestingly, the only statistically relevant bias 
related to law school choice showed that graduates of law schools in the top 10 take 
slightly longer to be confirmed (Column B – Table 22) than their counterparts.  This 
slight anomaly can be 
attributed to the fact that three of the seven nominations to take longer than one year to 
be confirmed came from top 10 schools.72 
Again, Harvard is the predominant choice of law school for district court judges.  
Of those confirmed since 1985, 52 judges were Harvard graduates – more than doubling 
their nearest competitor, Yale, with 23.  Upper echelon state law schools also offer 
impressive showings, with Texas, Virginia, California – Berkeley, and Florida providing 
a healthy number of its graduates to the district court bench. 
C. College Ranking73 
Table 24 illustrates that there is no statistical difference between groupings of 
undergraduate colleges attended by district court nominees.  Candidates from fourth tier 
schools take slightly longer to be confirmed, but not to a statistically relevant extent. 
Ivy league schools are the undergraduate schools of choice for district court 
nominees, as evidenced by the popularity of Harvard, Princeton, and Yale in Table 25.  
Note, however, the large number of judges educated at “Other” schools.  These schools 
 
72 These three nominations (Susan O. Mollway, Margaret M. Morrow, and Dan A. Polster) have some 
amazing similarities.  All three were nominated by President Clinton in his second term and all three 
attended Harvard Law School.  Additionally, both Mollway and Morrow were confirmed to posts in the 
Ninth Circuit (notorious for confirmation delay) and are female (again, subject to undue confirmation 
delay). 
73 Judges of the United States Courts, Federal Judiciary Center, available in <http://air.fjc.gov>.  (This site 
provided information on the college attended by each judge.  In the case of judges with multiple degrees, 
the first degree obtained was used.  College Rankings were obtained from U.S. News & World Report, 
available in <http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/college/corank.htm>). 
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are typically smaller, liberal arts colleges not rated by U.S. News & World Report in the 
major university category. 
D. Federal Circuit74 
Similar to the findings at the circuit court level, district court confirmations to the 
First Circuit occur substantially quicker than in other circuits (Column B - Table 26).  An 
extraordinary 56.0% of nominees to district court posts in the First Circuit are confirmed 
in 60 days or less, compared to a nationwide average of 34.4%.  Unlike circuit court 
posts, however, there are no circuits in which excessive (compared to the national 
average) delays are found. 
E. Congress75 
Table 27 offers an interesting look at the effect that the year of a President’s term 
can have on the confirmation process.  Note the quicker confirmation times of the first 
two years of a term (Columns B, D, and F) compared to the longer confirmation times of 
the last two years of a term (Columns C, E, and G).  This trend did not hold true for the 
105th Congress, however, as the impeachment proceedings concerning Bill Clinton may 
likely have had an impact on confirmation times during the first two years of President 
Clinton’s last term.  It should also be noted that the last three Congressional periods 
analyzed (Columns G, H, and I) involved the combination of a Democratic President and 
a Republican Senate – a combination that clearly contributes to judicial confirmation 
delay. 
F. Political Party – President/Senate76 
74 Judges of the United States Courts, Federal Judiciary Center, available in <http://air.fjc.gov>. 
75 Judges of the United States Courts, Federal Judiciary Center, available in <http://air.fjc.gov>. 
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The delays created by diverse control of the White House and the Senate is clearly 
evident in Table 28.  District court nominees of a Republican President that are 
confirmed by a Republican Senate (Column F) are confirmed in a little more than six 
weeks while judges nominated by a Democratic President for confirmation by a 
Republican Senate take more than three times as long to be confirmed (Column C).  
There can be no doubt that partisan politics, particularly when there is tension between 
the President and the Senate, have a tremendous effect on the confirmation of district 
court judges. 
G. Year of President’s Term77 
Similar to the analysis provided for circuit court nominations, Table 29 
demonstrates that confirmations take progressively longer as a President’s term advances.  
Note that 15 of the 16 longest confirmations (over 300 days – Columns C and E) 
occurred in the even numbered years of a President’s term.  The statistical reasons for 
this delay are documented in this section of the circuit court analysis – but the logic 
clearly demonstrates that it is impossible for any confirmation that takes longer than one 
year to occur in an odd-numbered year of a President’s term. 
H. Presidential Term78 
Table 30 shows in yet another way the increased delays plaguing the 
confirmation process.  These delays can be analyzed in several ways, but one way 
 
76 Information for these tables was collected from three sources: United States Presidents, available in 
<http://www.theriver.com/TheRiver/Café/Calendar/us2pres.html>; Majority and Minority Parties, Senate 
Statistics, available in <http://www.senate.gov/learning/stat13.html>; Majority and Minority Leaders, 
Senate Statistics, available in <http://www.senate.gov/learning/stat8.html>. 
77 Judges of the United States Courts, Federal Judiciary Center, available in <http://air.fjc.gov>. 
78 Information for these tables was collected from two sources: United States Presidents, available in 
<http://www.theriver.com/TheRiver/Café/Calendar/us2pres.html>; Judges of the United States Courts, 
Federal Judiciary Center, available in <http://air.fjc.gov>. 
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that is most revealing involves the number of rapid (under 60 days) confirmations.  
In President Reagan’s second term, 55.9% of all district court confirmations 
occurred in 60 days or less.  Contrast that with the mere 14.0% rapid 
confirmations during President Clinton’s second term.  Thus, the increased 
average delays are not the result of a few contentious confirmations; rather, the 
fault can be placed on the almost total extinction of the “rapid confirmation”. 
IV. United States Circuit Court Judge Confirmations Since 196179 
While examination of Supreme Court confirmation delays yields some interesting 
trends, it is at the circuit and district court levels where the confirmation process seems 
most troubled.  Vacancies on the Supreme Court are not tolerated for very long, while 
long delays at the lower levels of the Judiciary have become so common as to be 
accepted as normal operating procedure.  This section examines Circuit Court of Appeals 
confirmations since 1961.  362 confirmations are analyzed here in order to determine if 
there are demographic and political factors that have substantial effect on confirmation 
times of circuit court judges. 
A. Gender/Age/Ethnic Origin80 
What may be obvious to seasoned observers of the Judicial appointment process 
is clearly illustrated in Column C of Table 10 – nominations of female judges to the 
circuit courts take almost twice as long (118.04 days to 69.69 days) as their male 
counterparts.  The bias against female judges is evident at both ends of the confirmation 
 
79 The timeframe of 1961-2000 for circuit court judges was selected for two reasons.  First, a cursory 
examination of confirmation delays indicate that such delays first became prevalent in the 1960s.  Second, 
such a timeframe allows examination of Presidential terms that were equally split between Republicans and 
Democrats (20 years each). 
80 Judges of the United States Courts, Federal Judiciary Center, available in <http://air.fjc.gov>.   
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delay scale.  While 56.8% of male nominees are confirmed in 60 days or less, only 
26.7% of female nominees are confirmed that rapidly.  On the opposite end of the scale, 
six judges took more than one year to be confirmed – three of those were female.  This 
statistic would not be so alarming were it not for the fact that 317 of the 362 nominations 
were males.  Thus, almost 7% of female nominees take more than one year to be 
confirmed while less than 1% of males are similarly delayed. 
It is important to note that the appointment of women judges was quite the 
exception as late as the 1960’s.  Shortly after President Kennedy took office in 1961, 
Congress enacted a bill creating seventy-three new federal judgeships.81 Kennedy, at the 
urging of women’s groups, pledged to appoint both “men and women of unquestioned 
ability”.82 Yet Kennedy appointed only one woman to a lifetime judgeship, Sarah T. 
Hughes of the Northern District of Texas.83 Kennedy’s successor, Lyndon Johnson, 
performed no better in the appointment of women to the federal bench.  By 1967, 
Johnson’s only female appointment to a lifetime post was Constance Baker Motley.84 
Age at confirmation does not seem to particularly affect confirmation times, 
although it takes slightly longer than average for nominees over the age of 60 to be 
confirmed. 
In the section analyzing Supreme Court nominations, it is noted that African-
American nominees take much longer to be confirmed.  This problem is not nearly as 
pervasive at the circuit court level.  African-American judges take only slightly longer 
 
81 SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES 180 (1997). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. (Motley was especially noteworthy as she became the first African-American woman to be appointed 
to the federal bench). 
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(83.09 days to 71.45 days) to confirm than their Caucasian counterparts.  At the circuit 
court level, the ethnic group most encumbered by prolonged confirmation processes are 
Hispanic judges.  Hispanic nominees to the circuit courts take more than twice as long 
(168.25 days) to confirm as all other ethnic groups combined.  Thus, it seems as if the 
ethnic bias that may exist at the Supreme Court level against African-American nominees 
almost certainly exists at the circuit court level against Hispanics. 
An interesting question arises when considering the circuit court bias against 
Hispanic nominees.  Is the bias racial or political?  While President Richard Nixon 
nominated the first Asian-American to the appeals court bench,85 he and his aides were 
extremely interested in appointing (what they believed to be) the first Hispanic judge to 
the federal bench as well.86 It is likely that the Nixon administration was more motivated 
by the allure of increasing Hispanic votes for the Republican party than by any desire for 
racial equity in judicial appointments.  Other administrations, both Republican and 
Democrat, can be suspected of using the selection of Hispanic nominees to the bench as 
political, rather than meritorious, appointments. 
B. Law School Ranking87 
In another interesting paradox, Table 11 demonstrates that graduates of top 10 law 
schools take longer to be confirmed as circuit court judges than graduates of other law 
 
85 Id. at 218.  (Nixon nominated Herbert Y.C. Choy, of Korean ancestry) for a seat on the Ninth Circuit on 
April 7, 1971). 
86 Id. at 218-219.  (Nixon considered making Arthur L. Alarcon the first Mexican American federal judge.  
Unbeknownst to Nixon and his aides, John Kennedy had already appointed Reynaldo Garza and Lyndon 
Johnson had likewise appointed Manuel Real, both of whom were Mexican Americans.  Harold Medina 
had also already been appointed to the bench, but his Hispanic origins were unknown both by the 
administration that appointed him and the public). 
87 Judges of the United States Courts, Federal Judiciary Center, available in <http://air.fjc.gov>.  (This site 
provided information on the law school attended by each judge.  In the case of judges with multiple law 
degrees, the first law degree obtained was used.  Law School Rankings were obtained from U.S. News & 
World Report, available in <http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/beyond/gradrank/law/gdlawt1.htm>). 
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schools.  Not only do graduates of the top 10 law schools take longer to be confirmed 
than graduates of schools not ranked in the top 10 (an average of 88.10 days compared to 
an overall average of 75.70 days), but 5 of the 6 nominees that took over a year to be 
confirmed came from top 10 law schools. 
It is possible that this paradox exists because of the prolific writing of circuit court 
nominees from top 10 schools.  Controversial writings can sometimes cause delays in 
confirmation.  More likely, however, is the recognition that circuit court judges from top 
10 schools are prime candidates for eventual Supreme Court appointments.  This 
likelihood may cause the Senate to subject these “elite” candidates to greater scrutiny 
than other circuit court nominees. 
Table 12 further illustrates the dominance that Harvard Law School graduates 
exercise on the federal bench.  57 of the judges included in this study attended Harvard; 
the next most prolific school, Yale, supplied 32 of its graduates to circuit court posts.  
The dominance of Ivy League schools at the Supreme Court level carries over, albeit to a 
lesser degree, at the circuit court level.  Here, prestigious state universities begin to make 
their presence known with schools such as Michigan, Virginia, and Texas providing 
significant numbers of their graduates to the federal bench. 
C. College Ranking88 
Much like the Supreme Court analysis, there is little statistical significance to the 
undergraduate school attended by circuit court judges with regard to confirmation delays.  
One notable exception, however, can be seen in Column G of Table 13.  Graduates of 
 
88 Judges of the United States Courts, Federal Judiciary Center, available in <http://air.fjc.gov>.  (This site 
provided information on the college attended by each judge.  In the case of judges with multiple degrees, 
the first degree obtained was used.  College Rankings were obtained from U.S. News & World Report, 
available in <http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/college/corank.htm>). 
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“fourth tier” universities take almost twice as long to be confirmed as graduates of any 
other group of schools.  Since only eight such graduates have been confirmed, it is 
possible that this delay is merely a statistical anomaly that would not exist were there 
more appointees from this group of schools. 
Again, Table 14 shows that Ivy League schools are the most common training 
grounds for circuit court judges, with major state universities also well represented.  It is 
interesting to note that the United States Military Academy and the United States Naval 
Academy (with four and two confirmations respectively) are well represented in the 
circuit courts. 
D. Federal Circuit89 
Since 1961, almost 30% of the circuit court appointments have been to one of two 
circuits, the Ninth (with 57 confirmations) and the Fifth (with 50).  As Table 15 
illustrates, lengthy confirmation times are prevalent in four circuits: the Second, Ninth, 
Eleventh, and Federal Circuits.  Conversely, confirmations are much faster than average 
in the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits. 
E. Congress90 
Throughout the sixties and seventies, confirmation times for circuit court judges 
stayed consistently under 45 days with one notable exception.  As shown in Column K of 
Table 16, the 96th Congress in 1979-1980 experienced significant delays in confirming 
President Carter’s circuit court nominees.  One can speculate that foreign policy 
distractions such as the hostage crisis in Tehran coupled with his imminent departure 
from the White House after a single term likely contributed to these extraordinary delays. 
 
89 Judges of the United States Courts, Federal Judiciary Center, available in <http://air.fjc.gov>. 
90 Id. 
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Table 17 illustrates the increasing delays in circuit court confirmations over the 
last half of the eighties and the entirety of the nineties.  Beginning with the then record 
average confirmation time of 118.81 days for the 100th Congress in 1987-1988, the 
delays have increased for the most part with each subsequent Congress through the 106th 
Congress, which took an excruciatingly long 226.87 days to confirm circuit court judges.  
Note, for example, that the 99th Congress (or, more precisely, the 99th Senate) confirmed 
23 circuit court judges in 60 days or less – more than the next seven Congressional 
sessions combined! 
F. Political Party – President/Senate91 
If the results of the 2002 election return control of the Senate to the Republican 
party, circuit judge confirmations may occur more rapidly.  As Column F of Table 18 
illustrates, the shortest confirmation times since 1961 have occurred when Republican-
controlled Senates confirm the nominations of a Republican President.  Conversely, the 
longest confirmation times (almost three times longer than average) occurred when 
Democratic Presidents submitted nominees to Republican Senates. 
Admittedly, the abnormally long confirmation times for judges nominated by 
Democratic presidents and confirmed by a Republican Senate (Column C of Table 18) 
are due in large part to the fact that from 1994-2000, there was a Democratic President-
Republican Senate combination.  In fact, 20 of the 25 longest confirmation delays (each 
over 200 days) have occurred with a Democrat in the White House.  This problem is not 
limited to Bill Clinton, however – John F. Kennedy and Jimmy Carter also submitted 
 
91 Information for these tables was collected from three sources: United States Presidents, available in 
<http://www.theriver.com/TheRiver/Café/Calendar/us2pres.html>; Majority and Minority Parties, Senate 
Statistics, available in <http://www.senate.gov/learning/stat13.html>; Majority and Minority Leaders, 
Senate Statistics, available in <http://www.senate.gov/learning/stat8.html>. 
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nominees that were similarly delayed.  Interestingly, only three Presidents in the last 
forty years have escaped this logjam – Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Gerald 
Ford. 
Another negative influence on circuit judge confirmation time is related to Senate 
leadership.  While nominees for the circuits that are home to the Majority Leader and 
Majority Whip of the Senate are confirmed slightly more rapidly than average, those 
nominees from the circuits of the Minority leadership experience delays that are 
significantly longer than average (Columns J and K of Table 18). 
G. Year of President’s Term92 
Because circuit court nominations are much more frequent and are less subject to 
media scrutiny, the Senate is much more likely to delay confirmation in the latter stages 
of a President’s term in the hopes of minority Senators that their party’s candidate will 
prevail in the presidential election, thus allowing the new president to nominate judges 
more sympathetic to their ideology.  Table 19 shows that circuit court judges confirmed 
in the first year of a President’s term are confirmed in just 46.41 days (Column B) while 
fourth-year confirmations take an average of 107.37 days (Column E).   
Note, however, that second-year nominations (Column C) take slightly longer 
than third-year nominations (Column D).  There are two fundamental reasons that may 
be responsible for this anomaly.  First, abnormally long confirmation almost always 
occur in the even-numbered years of a President’s term, since longer confirmations 
frequently cross from the first year of a particular Congress to the second.  For example, 
it would be almost impossible for a nominee that took 270 days to confirm to be 
 
92 Judges of the United States Courts, Federal Judiciary Center, available in <http://air.fjc.gov>. 
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nominated and confirmed in the first or third year of a President’s term93 – invariably, the 
nominee’s confirmation period would extend beyond January 1 of the nominating year 
and result in confirmation in an even-numbered year. 
The second and more politically-related reason centers on Congressional 
elections.  It is likely that second-year confirmations are delayed in the hopes that the 
minority party will prevail in the November elections and regain power.  Moreover, a 
third of the Senate is actively engaged in elections of their own during these years.  Once 
the elections are resolved and future party control of the Senate is known, confirmations 
(albeit unduly delayed) resume. 
H. Presidential Term94 
Table 20 offers perhaps the most vivid display on the progressive deterioration of 
the once speedy confirmation of circuit court judges.  For example, 19 of John F. 
Kennedy’s 20 nominees (Column B) were confirmed in under 60 days.  Richard Nixon, 
in an abbreviated second term plagued by Watergate scandal, had all eight of his 
nominees confirmed in 60 days or less (Column F).  Contrast these results with the 
dismal confirmation record of Bill Clinton’s two terms (Columns L and M), where less 
than 10 percent (6 confirmations out of 65) or circuit court judges were confirmed in 
under 61 days. 
 
93 Incidentally, three of Bill Clinton’s nominees accomplished this feat of timing.  In the third year of 
Clinton’s first term, James L. Dennis was nominated and confirmed in the same year with a delay of 252 
days.  In the first year of his second term, Clinton managed the feat again with the confirmation of Marjorie 
O. Rendell in 262 days.  Last, President Clinton set the dubious modern record for odd-year confirmation 
by nominating and confirming Ronald M. Gould in 295 days of the same calendar year. 
94 Information for these tables was collected from two sources: United States Presidents, available in 
<http://www.theriver.com/TheRiver/Café/Calendar/us2pres.html>; Judges of the United States Courts, 
Federal Judiciary Center, available in <http://air.fjc.gov>. 
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Table 20 clearly demonstrates that these delays are not specific to the Clinton 
presidency – in fact, their roots can be traced to the Carter administration.  President 
Carter’s circuit court nominees took twice as long to be confirmed as the nominees of 
any prior President since Kennedy.  After a brief return to efficient confirmation during 
the first Reagan administration, confirmation delays increased from a crisp 39.21 days 
(Column I) to the tortoise-like 214.20 days of the second Clinton administration (Column 
M). 
At least some of the delays of Carter’s nominees may be attributed to President 
Carter’s keen interest in judicial selection reform and the passage of the Omnibus 
Judgeship Act of 1978.  During his campaign in 1976, Carter pledged that he would 
refrain from appointing judges for political reasons and instead select judges based on 
merit.95 To implement his plan, Carter issued Executive Order 11972 creating the United 
States Circuit Judge Nominating Commission just four weeks after taking office.96 The 
Commission created panels of lawyers and nonlawyers designed to provide nomination 
recommendations to the President.97 The Commission failed to achieve its desired 
results, as differences over affirmative action regarding circuit court nominations and 
reluctance from Senators of both parties to yield their influence in the process only 
contributed to the excessive delays of appointments during the Carter administration.98 
Thus, despite the fact that the Omnibus Act created 117 new federal district court 
 
95 GOLDMAN, supra note 23, at 238. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 238-50. 
30 
judgeships and 35 new appeals court posts, confirmations were hampered with longer 
delays than ever.99 
V. United States Supreme Court Confirmations Since 1789100 
Although to a lesser degree than the gridlock plaguing circuit and district court 
appointments, Senate confirmation of Supreme Court Justices has also evolved into a 
more prolonged and exasperating process.  Bill Clinton’s two appointments (Justices 
Breyer and Ginsburg) waited 72 and 43 days respectively.101 In contrast, nine of George 
Washington’s ten appointments were confirmed in two days or less.102 One might argue 
that such efficiency could be attributed to the infancy of the nation and the possibility that 
the Senate did not fully comprehend the important role that the Supreme Court would 
play in the development of the United States.  Others might contend that the extended 
duration of the confirmation process can be attributed to the heightened media scrutiny 
surrounding judicial nominations, particularly in the Supreme Court.  These arguments, 
however, lose some of their luster when compared to some of the rapid confirmations that 
have occurred in the last half of the 20th century.  Justice Byron R. White, for example, 
was nominated by President Kennedy and confirmed just eight days later.103 Chief 
Justice Warren Earl Burger (nominated by President Nixon) was confirmed in an equally 
astonishing seventeen days.104 
99 Id. at 241-42. 
100 Included in the analysis of Supreme Court confirmations are those confirmations wherein an Associate 
Justice of the Court was elevated to Chief Justice.  Thus, several Supreme Court justices (e.g., Rehnquist) 
were actually confirmed twice by the United States Senate and are included twice in this analysis. 
101 Judges of the United States Courts, Federal Judiciary Center, available in <http://air.fjc.gov>.   
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
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Nevertheless, rapid confirmations of Supreme Court Justices seem to be the 
exception rather than the rule.  In this section, all 110 Supreme Court confirmations will 
be analyzed and compared according to a variety of demographic and political factors to 
determine which factors affect the confirmation times of United States Supreme Court 
Justices. 
A. Gender/Age/Ethnic Origin105 
Table 1 details the Gender, Age, and Ethnic Origins of all Supreme Court 
Justices.  The average confirmation time for a Supreme Court Justice is 22.17 days.  
Although there have only been two women confirmed to the Court, the data in Table 1 
suggests that women take longer to be confirmed than men.  The statistics are skewed, 
however, by the rapid confirmation times of the 18th and 19th centuries, when no women 
were permitted to vote, much less serve on the Court.  Closer examination of the data in 
Table 9 of this Note (Supreme Court confirmation times by Presidential Term) shows 
that Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s average confirmation 
time of 37.50 days was far superior to other Justices of the modern era.  In fact, one must 
look all the way back to Gerald Ford’s nomination of John Paul Stevens in 1975 to find a 
quicker confirmation than those of the Court’s first two female Justices.  If anything, the 
limited data indicates that females are typically confirmed more rapidly than their male 
counterparts. 
Table 1 also examines confirmation times based on the ages of Justices on their 
date of confirmation.  Overall, the data suggests that younger nominees are confirmed 
 
105 Judges of the United States Courts, Federal Judiciary Center, available in <http://air.fjc.gov>.  (Note that 
the birth dates for John Blair, Jr., James Moore Wayne, and John Catron are listed only with the year of 
their respective births.  Thus, an arbitrary mid-year birth date of June 30 was used for these three Supreme 
Court justices as a “best guess” for statistical analysis). 
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more rapidly than older nominees.  Some of this can be attributed to the tendency in the 
early years of the Court to nominate younger men.  Attorneys of the 18th and 19th 
centuries were not required to attend a four year college and three years of law school to 
practice law – many, in fact, were self-educated or “read law” for established attorneys to 
prepare for legal practice.  Additionally, the increased life expectancy of today has 
provided a greater likelihood that older persons will be nominated to the Court.  One 
statistical anomaly had a substantial effect on the observation that younger nominees 
were confirmed more rapidly than others.  The 41-45 age group took twice as long to be 
confirmed as 46-50 and five times longer than those 40 and under.  This can largely be 
attributed to the unprecedented delay and scrutiny surrounding the nomination of 
Clarence Thomas.  The average confirmation time for nominees between 41 and 45 
would have been less than 18 days (rather than an average of over 24 days including 
Justice Thomas) were it not for his controversial and prolonged Senate confirmation.106 
Analysis of Supreme Court confirmations based on Ethnic Origin is constrained 
by the scarcity of minority appointments.  As with females, there have only been two 
minority confirmations to the Supreme Court.  Unlike the gender analysis, there appears 
to be a clear increase in confirmation times for African-American nominees when 
compared to their Caucasian counterparts.  Caucasian nominees were confirmed in an 
average of 20.94 days.  In contrast, the two African-American nominees (Justices 
Thurgood Marshall and Clarence Thomas) were confirmed in 78 and 99 days 
respectively.107 While two nominations are certainly insufficient to imply statistical 
reliability, the wide disparity in confirmation times between Caucasians and African-
 
106 Justice Thomas, at age 43, took 99 days to be confirmed in 1991. 
107 Judges of the United States Courts, Federal Judiciary Center, available in <http://air.fjc.gov>.   
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Americans suggests that close scrutiny should be directed toward future minority 
nominations to insure that any excessive delays be attributable to legitimate judicial 
concerns rather than racial bias. 
B. Law School Ranking108 
Analysis of Supreme Court confirmations based on the law school attended by 
each Justice yielded an inverse bell-curve for confirmation times.  Justices attending 
unranked law schools (typically 18th and 19th century appointments) and those Justices 
attending law schools ranked 11-50 or in the second tier were confirmed most rapidly.  
Third and fourth tier law school graduates took almost twice as long to be confirmed.  
Interestingly, graduates of top 10 law schools took twice as long to be confirmed as 
Supreme Court Justices than those graduating from other schools.  The data does not 
suggest any historical bias for this result.  Instead, it might be speculated that graduates 
from top 10 programs may have published significantly more articles and papers that 
would lengthen the confirmation process as the Senate studied these writings, or that 
such high profile nominees might have otherwise generated more attention and 
controversy than those nominees from schools less renowned.  While there is no direct 
evidence to suggest this, it seems a plausible theory for delays where a reasonable 
observer might expect speedier confirmations. 
Table 3 lists the totals for each law school attended by at least one Justice.  The 
large number categorized under “Other” includes those justices from the 18th and 19th 
108 Judges of the United States Courts, Federal Judiciary Center, available in <http://air.fjc.gov>.  (This site 
provided information on the law school attended by each judge.  In the case of judges with multiple law 
degrees, the first law degree obtained was used.  Many early Supreme Court Justices did not attend law 
school, but instead “read law”.  These Justices’ law school has been designated for analytical purposes as 
“Other”.  Law School Rankings were obtained from U.S. News & World Report, available in 
<http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/beyond/gradrank/law/gdlawt1.htm>). 
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centuries that did not attend law school, but instead gained their legal education in other 
ways.  Like the circuit court and district court judges discussed later in this Note, 
Harvard clearly dominates as the law school of choice among Supreme Court Justices.  
In fact, more Justices graduated from Harvard Law School than the next three most 
popular law schools (Yale, Columbia, and Michigan) combined.  One important factor to 
consider in evaluating this data would involve the number of students that graduate each 
year from these schools; if, for example, Harvard has historically admitted and graduated 
higher numbers of students, that would help explain their historical dominance in the 
Supreme Court. 
C. College Ranking109 
There appears to be no strong statistical correlation between a Supreme Court 
Justice’s choice of undergraduate college and the length of time necessary to gain 
confirmation to the Court (see Table 4).  Of the fifteen Justices requiring more than 60 
days for confirmation, almost half (seven) attended colleges rated in the top 10. 
Interestingly, however, Table 5 shows that Yale is a slightly more prevalent 
choice for undergraduate studies than Harvard.  Ivy League schools dwarf their 
counterparts for undergraduate studies among Supreme Court Justices (with the 
exception of the “Other” category which includes not only those Justices that did not 
attend undergraduate college, but also those who attended unranked liberal arts colleges). 
D. Congress110 
109 Judges of the United States Courts, Federal Judiciary Center, available in <http://air.fjc.gov>.  (This site 
provided information on the college attended by each judge.  In the case of judges with multiple degrees, 
the first degree obtained was used.  Some judges, particularly early Supreme Court Justices, either did not 
attend college or were admitted immediately to law school due to previous experience such as military 
service.  These Justices’ college has been designated for analytical purposes as “Other”.  College Rankings 
were obtained from U.S. News & World Report, available in 
<http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/college/corank.htm>). 
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Table 6 analyzes Congress in twenty-year increments in order to determine if 
there were certain periods in history in which confirmation of Supreme Court Justices 
was more fraught with delay than others.  Three distinct periods emerge from this 
analysis where confirmation delays were more common. 
The first instances of confirmation delay occurred during the evolution of the 
political party system that began with Federalist and Jeffersonian Republicans and 
resulted in the present day two-party structure of Democrats and Republicans.  For 
example, President James Monroe nominated Justice Smith Thompson late in his second 
Presidential term.111 Monroe, a Jeffersonian, saw this nomination delayed by a 
Jacksonian (named for soon-to-be-President Andrew Jackson) Congress for an 
unprecedented 95 days.112 Yet this delay had little to do with political differences.  
Unlike today, where nominees are carefully “vetted” by Presidents and where 
nominations are “accepted” prior to public release of the nominee’s identity, President 
Monroe nominated Smith Thompson without being certain that he would accept.113 The 
lengthy delay in Thompson’s confirmation was due to Thompson’s indecision on 
accepting the nomination.114 Once Thompson agreed, he was quickly confirmed.115 
Political differences and retribution for prior political actions were responsible, 
however, for delay when the nominations of Philip Pendleton Barbour and Roger Taney 
 
110 Judges of the United States Courts, Federal Judiciary Center, available in <http://air.fjc.gov>.  (This site 
provided both nomination and confirmation dates.  Recess appointments were not considered for purposes 
of this analysis.). 
111 Judges of the United States Courts, Federal Judiciary Center, available in <http://air.fjc.gov>.   
112 Id. 
113 HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS AND SENATORS 69 (1999). 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
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(both nominated by Andrew Jackson) were confirmed in a similarly excessive 78 days116 
by a Senate heavily influenced by the last vestiges of Whig and Calhounian factions.117 
Taney’s first nomination failed in the Senate, as the Senate refused to act on the 
nomination on the last day of its session.118 The controversy surrounding Taney was 
based in large part on his acts as Secretary of the Treasury (via recess appointment) 
under Jackson.119 Taney fully approved of and supervised President Jackson’s order that 
all government deposits be removed from the Bank of the United States.120 The Bank 
was the major controversy of the day, and the Whig and Calhounian factions retaliated 
by blocking Taney’s post-recess appointment as Treasury Secretary.121 An angry 
Jackson responded by nominating Taney for the Supreme Court, only to have the 
appointment blocked again by the opposition.122 
An infuriated Andrew Jackson refused to make another nomination, intent on 
nominating Taney again.123 The occasion to do so presented itself with the death of 
Chief Justice John Marshall on July 6, 1835.124 Jackson was now presented with the 
rather unique opportunity to nominate two Supreme Court Justices simultaneously, as 
well as nomination of a Chief Justice.125 Jackson responded by nominating Taney to 
succeed Marshall as Chief Justice and Philip Pendleton Barbour for the vacancy left 
 
116 Judges of the United States Courts, Federal Judiciary Center, available in <http://air.fjc.gov>.   
117 ABRAHAM, supra note 141, at 74-75 (1999). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 75. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
37 
unfilled with Taney’s previous nomination.126 Bitter debates ensued in the Senate over 
Taney, with Barbour’s confirmation delayed by his link to the Taney nomination.127 
Eventually, both were confirmed by votes that were not nearly as close as the lengthy 
debates might have suggested.128 
Certainly, the increasingly volatile issues of slavery and states’ rights contributed 
to these delays (as well as residual hard feelings over the Bank of the United States), but 
the precedent had been firmly established – one of the primary battlegrounds in political 
warfare was the confirmation of Supreme Court justices. 
The second period of excessive confirmation delay happened during the post-
Reconstruction period of  1869-1888.  Remarkably, confirmation times during the Civil 
War/Reconstruction era (1849-1868) were the fastest in American history, with Supreme 
Court Justices being confirmed in an average of 7.38 days.  This efficiency stands in 
stark contrast to the next 20-year span, in which the average confirmation time increased 
to 27.64 days.  Interestingly, the evidence indicates that these confirmation delays had 
more to do with judicial issues and conflicts of interest than politics.  Presidents 
Rutherford B. Hayes and James Garfield nominated Justices John Harlan and Stanley 
Matthews129 who were confirmed in 44 and 59 days, respectively.130 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. (Barbour was approved by a 30-11 margin in the Senate, while Taney was confirmed by a 29-15 
vote). 
129 Id. at 100.  (Matthews was originally nominated by Hayes in the last days of his administration and was 
not acted upon by the Senate.  Garfield resubmitted his name and Matthews was ultimately confirmed). 
130 Judges of the United States Courts, Federal Judiciary Center, available in <http://air.fjc.gov>.   
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Justice Harlan’s nomination was controversial by the nature of his background 
and judicial leanings.  John Marshall Harlan I131 was born of a slaveholding family.  As 
his judicial career evolved through Reconstruction, he became a strong advocate of the 
Civil War Amendments to the Constitution, and expressed his view in many dissenting 
opinions that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights.132 This view 
was considered “eccentric” at the time, but was later embraced by the Warren Court and 
its chief proponent of “absorption”, Justice Hugo L. Black.133 Nevertheless, this 
“eccentricity” resulted in delayed confirmation for Justice Harlan. 
The delays surrounding the nomination of Stanley Matthews are notable in that 
for perhaps the first time, organized interest groups demonstrated opposition to a 
nominee for the nation’s highest court.134 Matthews was considered unsuitable by many 
for his strong financial ties to corporate and railroad interests, most notably financier Jay 
Gould.135 These ties evoked such strong opposition in the Senate that, on Matthews’ first 
nomination, the Committee on the Judiciary refused to report the nomination for floor 
action.136 Surprisingly, newly elected President Garfield resubmitted Matthews almost 
immediately after taking office.137 The strong political and financial influence of Gould 
 
131 Abraham, supra note 141, at 101.  (Justice Harlan’s grandson, who bore his name, also served in the 
Supreme Court from 1955-1971). 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 102. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 103. 
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and his associates was primarily responsible for Matthews’ confirmation, albeit by a 
single vote.138 
Only the nominations of William B. Woods (nominated by Republican Hayes and 
confirmed by a Democratic Senate) and the Supreme Court nominations of President 
Chester A. Arthur (Horace Gray and Samuel Blatchford) were rapidly confirmed during 
this period.139 The election of Benjamin Hayes in 1892 signaled the end of this era of 
Supreme Court confirmation delay. 
As stated in the introduction of this note, we are currently embroiled in the 
longest and most extreme period of Supreme Court confirmation delay in American 
history.  Since 1949, the time required to confirm Supreme Court Justices has quadrupled 
from an average of 11.47 days140 to an average of almost 50 days.  The reasons for these 
delays are speculative, but certainly partisan politics is one of the chief culprits.  The 
influence of political factors in Supreme Court nominations is best evidenced by the 
nominees of Bill Clinton.  While the nominations of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen 
G. Breyer were no more politically motivated than normal, evidence of heightened 
political influence is best evidenced by Clinton’s initial selections, each of whom refused 
 
138 Id. (To date, Stanley Matthews remains the only Supreme Court Justice confirmed by a single vote – he 
was confirmed by a 24-23 margin after two months of bitter debate). 
139 Id. (Justice Woods’ nomination was confirmed in 6 days while President Arthur’s nominations of 
Horace Gray and Samuel Blatchford took 1 and 9 days, respectively).  See also id. 103-04.  (In the wake of 
Arthur’s unpopular selection as Garfield’s Vice President amid allegations of “political hackmanship and 
spoilsmanship”, most observers were thrilled that Arthur rejected such partisan leanings in selecting two 
nominees that were eminently qualified and almost universally respected.  Alas, Arthur returned to his roots 
with the nomination of his one-time political mentor, Senator Roscoe Conkling of New York.  In keeping 
with the Senate’s tradition of never rejecting one of its own, Conkling was confirmed easily in spite of 
acrimonious floor debate.  Conkling, however, declined the appointment just five days later, prompting the 
New York Times’ sarcastic suggestion that he deferred because “there was not enough money in the post of 
justice of the U.S. Supreme Court”). 
140 In the Depression and World War II era of 1929-1948, fifteen Justices were confirmed.  Amazingly, 
each Justice was confirmed in less than 30 days as President Roosevelt and a heavily Democratic Senate 
controlled the most efficient confirmation process since the Civil War. 
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the nomination.  Clinton’s first choice for the seat ultimately occupied by Ginsburg was 
New York Governor Mario Cuomo.141 After Cuomo declined, Clinton looked to 
Secretary of Education Richard Riley and Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt.142 
Each was ultimately deterred from accepting for political reasons as well.143 Clinton’s 
selection of Breyer was made only after Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell 
declined, again citing political influences.144 Thus, it seems likely that political 
influences have impacted recent Supreme Court confirmation delays, since it soon 
becomes public knowledge that nominees are not even a President’s first choice.  
Additionally, heightened media scrutiny and an ever-increasing recognition by the 
American public of the importance of Supreme Court appointments have contributed to 
these increased delays.  As columns J, K, and L of Table 6 indicate, delays continue to 
rise in the confirmation of Supreme Court Justices. 
E. Political Party – President/Senate145 
In the previous section, it was noted that the first era of confirmation delay was 
based on political party upheaval and times when the political affiliation of the President 
is at odds with the political party controlling the Senate.  Table 7 examines Supreme 
Court nominations under these circumstances. 
Not surprisingly, Supreme Court confirmations take twice as long on average 
when there are conflicting parties in control of the Executive branch and the Senate.  
 
141 Id. at 317.   
142 Id. at 318. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 322.  (Mitchell declined, providing the explanation that his nomination would impact his ability to 
serve as floor leader for the passage of the Clinton health care legislation, which ultimately failed anyway). 
145 Information for these tables was collected from two sources: United States Presidents, available in 
<http://www.theriver.com/TheRiver/Café/Calendar/us2pres.html>; Majority and Minority Parties, Senate 
Statistics, available in <http://www.senate.gov/learning/stat13.html>. 
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Column C of Table 7 shows that nominees by a Democratic President confirmed by a 
Republican Senate take twice as long as similar nominations confirmed by a Democratic 
Senate (an average of 42.67 days to 21.14 days).  A similar disparity is evident when the 
roles are reversed, as Democratic Senates take three times as long to confirm the 
nominees of a Republican President than do Republican Senates (47.57 days to 25.73).  
This data provides strong evidence that the Supreme Court confirmation process is 
heavily politicized and that extended confirmation times are the result of partisan 
wrangling when opposing political parties control the Presidency and the Senate.  Of 
course, there are some that would argue that the process was designed to be subject to 
political pressures and that vigorous confirmation proceedings insure that appointments 
to the Court are thoroughly scrutinized and representative of the judicial preferences of 
the electorate. 
F. Year of President’s Term146 
Another factor in confirmation delays for Supreme Court Justices involves the 
year of the Presidential term (i.e., first year, fourth year, etc.) in which the Justice was 
nominated.  Table 8 illustrates that confirmation times are affected by the year of a 
President’s term. 
Supreme Court nominations made in the first two years of a President’s term are 
confirmed much more rapidly than the third or fourth years.  First year nominations are 
confirmed in an average of 14.75 days and second year nominations are approved in an 
average of 18.21 days.  In contrast, third year confirmations take an average of 33.86 
years – more than twice the time required in the first two years.  Fourth year 
 
146 Judges of the United States Courts, Federal Judiciary Center, available in <http://air.fjc.gov>. 
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confirmations are also above the average time of 22.17 days with an average 
confirmation of 26.77 days. 
Data indicating that confirmation times are longer in the third year rather than the 
fourth might lead one to believe that an imminent change in party control of the White 
House is not the driving force that one might assume.  However, several of the quickest 
fourth year confirmations occurred in the final year of popular President’s (e.g., Grant, 
Lincoln, Jefferson) first terms – when it was probably evident to the Senate that 
cooperation might be in the best interest of a Senate that would be expected to work with 
the nominating President for an additional four years.  Thus, it is evident that an 
important factor in the confirmation times of Supreme Court Justices is the year of the 
term of the nominating President – the earlier in the term the nomination is made, the 
speedier the resulting confirmation. 
G. Presidential Term147 
One might assume that confirmation delays have been more prevalent among 
nominations made by controversial Presidents.  Analysis of confirmations made since 
1961 suggests otherwise. 
Since 1961, three of the most lopsided victors in Presidential elections have been 
Lyndon Johnson in 1964,148 Ronald Reagan in 1984,149 and George H.W. Bush in 
 
147 Information for these tables was collected from two sources: United States Presidents, available in 
<http://www.theriver.com/TheRiver/Café/Calendar/us2pres.html>; Judges of the United States Courts, 
Federal Judiciary Center, available in <http://air.fjc.gov>. 
148 Electoral College Box Scores, available in <http://www.nara.gov/fedreg/elctcoll/ec-boxsc.html>.  
(President Lyndon Johnson won reelection over Republican Barry Goldwater in 1964 by an electoral vote 
margin of 486-52). 
149 Id. (President Ronald Reagan won reelection over Democrat Walter Mondale in 1984 by an electoral 
vote margin of 525-13). 
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1988.150 Amazingly, these three Presidential terms resulted in the longest confirmation 
delays of their times.  Lyndon Johnson’s nominees, highlighted by the confirmation of 
the Court’s first African-American Justice, averaged a confirmation time of 46 days – a 
sharp contrast to the 8 day confirmation of John F. Kennedy’s lone nominee and the 
17.31 day average confirmation time prior to 1961.  Ronald Reagan’s second-term 
nominations were confirmed in an average of 79.67 days and George H.W. Bush’s 
nominees took a record average 84 days to confirm. 
Perplexingly, Presidents elected in close elections were able to get their nominees 
confirmed in much less time than their  counterparts elected by larger margins.  As 
mentioned, John F. Kennedy’s151 nomination of Justice Byron White was confirmed in 
just 8 days.  Richard M. Nixon’s152 nominees were confirmed in just 34.5 days 
(compared to the 46 day mark of his immediate predecessor, Lyndon Johnson).  Even the 
controversial presidency of Bill Clinton153 resulted in quicker Supreme Court 
confirmations than either of his Republican predecessors. 
Thus, a strange paradox exists regarding Presidential popularity and Supreme 
Court confirmations.  The more popular a President (from an electoral standpoint), the 
more difficulty he will apparently experience in confirming his Supreme Court nominees.  
This paradox must be applied in the context of the other factors analyzed here.  For 
example, the premise did not hold true during the tenure of Franklin Roosevelt, due in 
 
150 Id. (Vice President George H.W. Bush was elected over Democrat Michael Dukakis in 1988 by an 
electoral vote margin of 426-111). 
151 Id. (Senator John F. Kennedy defeated Vice President Richard M. Nixon in 1960 by an electoral vote 
margin of 303-219 and a margin of victory in the popular vote of less than one half of one percent). 
152 Id. (Richard M. Nixon prevailed in 1968 over Democrat Hubert H. Humphrey by an electoral vote 
margin of 301-191 while failing to receive more than 50% of the popular vote). 
153 Id. (Bill Clinton defeated President George H.W. Bush in 1992 by an electoral vote margin of 370-168 
while collecting a smaller percentage of the popular vote than any other victorious Presidential candidate). 
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large part to the overwhelming control his party enjoyed in the Senate throughout most of 
his twelve years in office. 
Conclusion 
The political discourse, Senatorial inaction, and statistical evidence yield an 
abundantly clear result – judicial nominations are being confirmed at a slower pace than 
at any time in our nation’s history.  But who (or what political party) is to blame?  The 
results of political and statistical analysis show that both parties are to blame for these 
increased delays.  The Senatorial gridlock resulting from the 2000 elections probably 
insured that this problem will get worse before it gets any better. 
From a political standpoint, there are delays whenever the President and the 
Senate majority are from different parties.  In the last twenty years, the delays have 
worsened due to the appointment of either extremely conservative or liberal judges, i.e., 
conservative nominations by Republican Presidents to a Democratic Senate or liberal 
nominations by a Democratic President to a Republican Senate.   
From a statistical standpoint, there are demographic or political traits that hasten 
or delay confirmation.  In the tables below, profiles are displayed for the nominees that 
could expect to be confirmed most rapidly and most slowly for each of the three judicial 
levels analyzed in this article. 
Supreme Court Rapid Confirmation Delayed Confirmation 
Gender Male Female 
Age 40 & Under 56-60 
Ethnic Origin Caucasian African-American 
Law School Ranked 11-25 Fourth Tier 
Undergraduate College Ranked 26-50 Top 10 
Presidential Party Republican Republican 
Senate Party Republican Democrat 
Year of President’s Term First Third 
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Circuit Court Rapid Confirmation Delayed Confirmation 
Gender Male Female 
Age 40 & Under Over 60 
Ethnic Origin Caucasian Hispanic 
Law School Ranked 26-50 Top 10 
Undergraduate College Second Tier Fourth Tier 
Federal Circuit First Ninth 
Presidential Party Republican Democrat 
Senate Party Republican Republican 
Senate Leadership154 Majority Leader Minority Whip 
Year of President’s Term First Fourth 
District Court Rapid Confirmation Delayed Confirmation 
Gender Male Female 
Age 40 & Under 46-50 
Ethnic Origin Caucasian Asian-American 
Law School Ranked 26-50 Top 10 
Undergraduate College Ranked 26-50 Fourth Tier 
Federal Circuit First Sixth 
Presidential Party Republican Democrat 
Senate Party Republican Republican 
Senate Leadership Minority Whip Minority Leader 
Year of President’s Term First Fourth 
The warning calls issued by President George W. Bush, Congressional leaders 
and Chief Justice Rehnquist are not mere political demagoguery – the judicial 
confirmation process is in a state of crisis.  There are several potential solutions.  One 
such solution involves dispensing with the requirement that a nominee be nominated and 
confirmed in the same session of Congress.  While that might actually extend some 
delays, it would eliminate the need for re-nomination of those whose nominations expired 
with a Congressional term.  Numerous complications from such a solution can be 
foreseen, particularly when an election results in a shift of party control in either the 
 
154 This category represents the judicial circuit that is the home of the designated Senate leader.  For 
example, if this category read “Majority Leader”, then it would be beneficial (or detrimental, depending on 
the column) to be from the home circuit of the leadership role mentioned. 
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Senate or the White House.  Elimination of “holds” and the “blue slip” procedures would 
also improve the process but would be unlikely to be adopted by the a Senate unwilling to 
forfeit powers already assumed. 
Another potential solution could be achieved with a mere changing of Senate 
rules regarding confirmations.  Instead of requiring specific confirmation of nominees, 
the confirmation process could be revised so that a supermajority of Senators would be 
required to reject a Presidential nomination.  Unless such a supermajority rejected the 
nominee in a timely manner, the nomination would be automatically confirmed after a 
designated period (120 days, for example).  This proposed solution is not likely to be 
accepted, however, since it greatly diminishes minority influence in the Senate and cedes 
too much power, perhaps, to the Executive Branch. 
Yet another proposed solution would result in a diminishment of Executive 
power.  Involvement of the Senate at the inception of the nomination process would 
almost certainly expedite confirmations, but at the expense of exposing the nomination 
process to greater political pressure prior to nomination and the aforementioned reduction 
of presidential power. 
President George W. Bush’s proposal, while noteworthy for its intent and 
bipartisan spirit, is unlikely to reduce confirmation gridlock.  Its primary weakness is that 
it is merely aspirational; there is nothing in his proposal that requires the Senate to act 
promptly.  Moreover, even if such requirements were part of the plan and Constitutional, 
Senate leaders from parties not in possession of the White House could still simply reject 
nominees and force the President to submit them again until appropriate dealing has been 
completed. 
47 
Any proposed solution to the ever-increasing problem of judicial confirmation 
delays is destined to be blocked by the very political forces that create the current delays.  
Unless partisan politics can be controlled or the confirmation procedure modified, it is 
foreseeable that the ongoing confirmation delays will only worsen in the years to come 
unless, of course, the same party controls both the Senate and the Presidency. 
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Table 1 - Gender/Age/Ethnic
Confirmation Days
Supreme Court Justices
---GENDER---- -----------AGE AT CONFIRMATION----------- -----------ETHNIC ORIGIN----------
Under Over Afr Asian Native
TOTAL Male Female 40 41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60 60 Cauc Amer Hisp Amer Amer
------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) (K) (L) (M) (N)
110 108 2 5 12 16 27 33 17 108 2 - - -
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
30 Days & Under 83 83 - 5 9 15 18 23 13 83 - - - -
75.5% 76.9% 100.0% 75.0% 93.8% 66.7% 69.7% 76.5% 76.9%
C GH GH K
31-60 Days 11 9 2 - 1 1 3 3 3 11 - - - -
10.0% 8.3% 100.0% 8.3% 6.2% 11.1% 9.1% 17.6% 10.2%
B K
61-90 Days 12 12 - - - - 6 5 1 11 1 - - -
10.9% 11.1% 22.2% 15.2% 5.9% 10.2% 50.0%
C DEF DEF
91-120 Days 3 3 - - 2 - - 1 - 2 1 - - -
2.7% 2.8% 16.7% 3.0% 1.9% 50.0%
121-150 Days 1 1 - - - - - 1 - 1 - - - -
0.9% 0.9% 3.0% 0.9%
151-180 Days - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Over 180 Days - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
MEAN 22.17 21.89 37.50 4.60 24.25 11.50 25.04 28.09 19.88 20.94 88.50 - - -
Comparison Groups: BC/DEFGHI/JKLMN
Independent Z-Test for Percentages
Upper case letters indicate significance at the 98% level.
Copyright (c) 2002 Marvin Longabaugh
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Table 2 - Law School Ranking
Confirmation Days
Supreme Court Justices
TOTAL Top 10 11-25 26-50 2nd Tier 3rd Tier 4th Tier Other
---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H)
110 38 3 4 - 3 1 61
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
30 Days & Under 83 24 3 4 - 2 - 50
75.5% 63.2% 100.0% 100.0% 66.7% 82.0%
G BH BH G G
31-60 Days 11 5 - - - - - 6
10.0% 13.2% 9.8%
CDFG CDFG
61-90 Days 12 6 - - - 1 1 4
10.9% 15.8% 33.3% 100.0% 6.6%
CD BFH
91-120 Days 3 2 - - - - - 1
2.7% 5.3% 1.6%
121-150 Days 1 1 - - - - - -
0.9% 2.6%
151-180 Days - - - - - - - -
Over 180 Days - - - - - - - -
MEAN 22.17 32.05 15.33 9.00 - 34.67 78.00 15.69
Comparison Groups: BCDEFGH
Independent Z-Test for Percentages
Upper case letters indicate significance at the 98% level.
Copyright (c) 2002 Marvin Longabaugh
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Table 4 - College Ranking
Confirmation Days
Supreme Court Justices
TOTAL Top 10 11-25 26-50 2nd Tier 3rd Tier 4th Tier Other
---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H)
110 35 10 4 4 - 1 56
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
30 Days & Under 83 25 7 4 3 - 1 43
75.5% 71.4% 70.0% 100.0% 75.0% 100.0% 76.8%
BH BH
31-60 Days 11 3 2 - 1 - - 5
10.0% 8.6% 20.0% 25.0% 8.9%
DG
61-90 Days 12 6 1 - - - - 5
10.9% 17.1% 10.0% 8.9%
DEG DEG
91-120 Days 3 1 - - - - - 2
2.7% 2.9% 3.6%
121-150 Days 1 - - - - - - 1
0.9% 1.8%
151-180 Days - - - - - - - -
Over 180 Days - - - - - - - -
MEAN 22.17 23.83 21.80 11.75 18.50 - 8.00 22.46
Comparison Groups: BCDEFGH
Independent Z-Test for Percentages
Upper case letters indicate significance at the 98% level.
Copyright (c) 2002 Marvin Longabaugh
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Table 6 - Congress Since 1789
Confirmation Days
Supreme Court Justices
--------------------------------------------CONGRESS-----------------------------------
1789- 1809- 1829- 1849- 1869- 1889- 1909- 1929- 1949- 1969- 1989-
1808 1828 1848 1868 1888 1908 1928 1948 1968 1988 Present
1st- 11th- 21st- 31st- 41st- 51st- 61st- 71st- 81st- 91st- 101st-
TOTAL 10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th 100th 110th
------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- -------
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) (K) (L)
110 15 4 10 8 11 10 13 15 10 9 6
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
30 Days & Under 83 14 3 8 7 6 9 12 15 5 3 1
75.5% 93.3% 75.0% 80.0% 87.5% 54.5% 90.0% 92.3% 100.0% 50.0% 33.3% 16.7%
FJKL L KL KL JKL FJKL
31-60 Days 11 - - - 1 4 1 - - 1 3 1
10.0% 12.5% 36.4% 10.0% 10.0% 33.3% 16.7%
BCDHI
61-90 Days 12 1 - 2 - 1 - - - 3 3 3
10.9% 6.7% 20.0% 9.1% 30.0% 33.3% 50.0%
CEGHI
91-120 Days 3 - 1 - - - - - - 1 - 1
2.7% 25.0% 10.0% 16.7%
121-150 Days 1 - - - - - - 1 - - - -
0.9% 7.7%
151-180 Days - - - - - - - - - - - -
Over 180 Days - - - - - - - - - - - -
MEAN 22.17 7.93 32.25 19.50 7.38 27.64 10.00 16.08 11.47 43.80 47.67 58.33
Comparison Groups: BCDEFGHIJKL
Independent Z-Test for Percentages
Upper case letters indicate significance at the 98% level.
Copyright (c) 2002 Marvin Longabaugh
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Table 7 - Political Party - President/Senate
Confirmation Days
Supreme Court Justices
------DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENT------ ------REPUBLICAN PRESIDENT------ ------OTHER PARTY PRESIDENT-----
----------------------------------------------SENATE----------------------------------------------
TOTAL Democrat Republican Other Democrat Republican Other Democrat Republican Other
---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J)
110 28 3 15 14 37 15 2 7 19
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
30 Days & Under 83 23 1 11 6 29 11 2 7 15
75.5% 82.1% 33.3% 73.3% 42.9% 78.4% 73.3% 100.0% 100.0% 78.9%
E E BCDEFG BCDEFG
31-60 Days 11 2 1 - 2 6 - - - -
10.0% 7.1% 33.3% 14.3% 16.2%
DGHIJ
61-90 Days 12 2 1 3 4 2 3 - - 3
10.9% 7.1% 33.3% 20.0% 28.6% 5.4% 20.0% 15.8%
HI
91-120 Days 3 - - 1 2 - 1 - - 1
2.7% 6.7% 14.3% 6.7% 5.3%
121-150 Days 1 1 - - - - - - - -
0.9% 3.6%
151-180 Days - - - - - - - - - -
Over 180 Days - - - - - - - - - -
MEAN 22.17 21.14 42.67 25.73 47.57 16.70 25.73 9.50 3.00 20.79
Comparison Groups: BCDEFGHIJ
Independent Z-Test for Percentages
Upper case letters indicate significance at the 98% level.
Copyright (c) 2002 Marvin Longabaugh
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Table 8 - Year of President's Term
Confirmation Days
Supreme Court Justices
-----------------TERM YEAR-----------------
TOTAL 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
110 28 38 22 22
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
30 Days & Under 83 23 30 14 16
75.5% 82.1% 78.9% 63.6% 72.7%
31-60 Days 11 4 4 2 1
10.0% 14.3% 10.5% 9.1% 4.5%
61-90 Days 12 1 4 3 4
10.9% 3.6% 10.5% 13.6% 18.2%
91-120 Days 3 - - 3 -
2.7% 13.6%
121-150 Days 1 - - - 1
0.9% 4.5%
151-180 Days - - - - -
Over 180 Days - - - - -
MEAN 22.17 14.75 18.21 33.86 26.77
Comparison Groups: BCDE
Independent Z-Test for Percentages
Upper case letters indicate significance at the 98% level.
Copyright (c) 2002 Marvin Longabaugh
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Table 9 - Presidential Term
Confirmation Days
Supreme Court Justices
-------------------------------------------PRESIDENTIAL TERM-----------------------------------
Before Johnson Johnson Nixon Nixon Reagan Reagan GHW Clinton Clinton
TOTAL 1961 Kennedy 1st 2nd 1st 2nd Ford Carter 1st 2nd Bush 1st 2nd
------ ------ ------- ------- ------- ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------- -------
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) (K) (L) (M) (N)
110 94 1 - 2 4 - 1 - 1 3 2 2 -
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
30 Days & Under 83 78 1 - 1 2 - 1 - - - - - -
75.5% 83.0% 100.0% 50.0% 50.0% 100.0%
JKLM B B
31-60 Days 11 7 - - - 2 - - - 1 - - 1 -
10.0% 7.4% 50.0% 100.0% 50.0%
CEHKL B
61-90 Days 12 6 - - 1 - - - - - 3 1 1 -
10.9% 6.4% 50.0% 100.0% 50.0% 50.0%
CFHJ B
91-120 Days 3 2 - - - - - - - - - 1 - -
2.7% 2.1% 50.0%
121-150 Days 1 1 - - - - - - - - - - - -
0.9% 1.1%
151-180 Days - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Over 180 Days - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
MEAN 22.17 17.31 8.00 - 46.00 34.50 - 19.00 - 33.00 79.67 84.00 57.50 -
Comparison Groups: BCDEFGHIJKLMN
Independent Z-Test for Percentages
Upper case letters indicate significance at the 98% level.
Copyright (c) 2002 Marvin Longabaugh
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Table 10 - Gender/Age/Ethnic
Confirmation Days
Circuit Court Judges
---GENDER---- -----------AGE AT CONFIRMATION----------- -----------ETHNIC ORIGIN----------
Under Over Afr Asian Native
TOTAL Male Female 40 41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60 60 Cauc Amer Hisp Amer Amer
------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) (K) (L) (M) (N)
362 317 45 16 42 96 93 77 38 324 23 12 3 -
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
60 & Under 192 180 12 9 22 51 50 42 18 179 10 1 2 -
53.0% 56.8% 26.7% 56.2% 52.4% 53.1% 53.8% 54.5% 47.4% 55.2% 43.5% 8.3% 66.7%
C L L
61-120 Days 109 90 19 4 11 28 30 25 11 94 8 7 - -
30.1% 28.4% 42.2% 25.0% 26.2% 29.2% 32.3% 32.5% 28.9% 29.0% 34.8% 58.3%
M M M
121-180 Days 29 23 6 2 5 9 4 5 4 26 3 - - -
8.0% 7.3% 13.3% 12.5% 11.9% 9.4% 4.3% 6.5% 10.5% 8.0% 13.0%
LM
181-240 Days 19 15 4 1 3 5 4 4 2 16 2 1 - -
5.2% 4.7% 8.9% 6.2% 7.1% 5.2% 4.3% 5.2% 5.3% 4.9% 8.7% 8.3%
M
241-300 Days 5 4 1 - - 2 1 1 1 4 - - 1 -
1.4% 1.3% 2.2% 2.1% 1.1% 1.3% 2.6% 1.2% 33.3%
301-365 Days 2 2 - - - - 1 - 1 1 - 1 - -
0.6% 0.6% 1.1% 2.6% 0.3% 8.3%
Over 1 Year 6 3 3 - 1 1 3 - 1 4 - 2 - -
1.7% 0.9% 6.7% 2.4% 1.0% 3.2% 2.6% 1.2% 16.7%
MEAN 75.70 69.69 118.04 63.44 81.62 73.92 81.02 64.73 88.08 71.45 83.09 168.25 108.00 -
Comparison Groups: BC/DEFGHI/JKLMN
Independent Z-Test for Percentages
Upper case letters indicate significance at the 98% level.
Copyright (c) 2002 Marvin Longabaugh
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Table 11 - Law School Ranking
Confirmation Days
Circuit Court Judges
TOTAL Top 10 11-25 26-50 2nd Tier 3rd Tier 4th Tier Other
---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H)
362 155 62 50 43 32 11 9
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
60 & Under 192 77 35 22 24 20 6 8
53.0% 49.7% 56.5% 44.0% 55.8% 62.5% 54.5% 88.9%
BCDE
61-120 Days 109 44 18 23 14 6 3 1
30.1% 28.4% 29.0% 46.0% 32.6% 18.8% 27.3% 11.1%
FH
121-180 Days 29 15 4 5 2 2 1 -
8.0% 9.7% 6.5% 10.0% 4.7% 6.2% 9.1%
H H
181-240 Days 19 11 4 - 1 2 1 -
5.2% 7.1% 6.5% 2.3% 6.2% 9.1%
DH
241-300 Days 5 3 - - 1 1 - -
1.4% 1.9% 2.3% 3.1%
301-365 Days 2 - - - 1 1 - -
0.6% 2.3% 3.1%
Over 1 Year 6 5 1 - - - - -
1.7% 3.2% 1.6%
MEAN 75.70 88.10 68.52 63.82 66.51 73.34 75.73 30.11
Comparison Groups: BCDEFGH
Independent Z-Test for Percentages
Upper case letters indicate significance at the 98% level.
Copyright (c) 2002 Marvin Longabaugh
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Table 13 - College Ranking
Confirmation Days
Circuit Court Judges
TOTAL Top 10 11-25 26-50 2nd Tier 3rd Tier 4th Tier Other
---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H)
362 79 36 29 54 30 8 126
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
60 & Under 192 42 16 11 31 14 4 74
53.0% 53.2% 44.4% 37.9% 57.4% 46.7% 50.0% 58.7%
61-120 Days 109 25 8 12 18 10 1 35
30.1% 31.6% 22.2% 41.4% 33.3% 33.3% 12.5% 27.8%
121-180 Days 29 6 7 3 3 2 - 8
8.0% 7.6% 19.4% 10.3% 5.6% 6.7% 6.3%
G G G
181-240 Days 19 1 4 3 1 3 - 7
5.2% 1.3% 11.1% 10.3% 1.9% 10.0% 5.6%
G
241-300 Days 5 2 1 - - - 1 1
1.4% 2.5% 2.8% 12.5% 0.8%
301-365 Days 2 - - - - - 2 -
0.6% 25.0%
Over 1 Year 6 3 - - 1 1 - 1
1.7% 3.8% 1.9% 3.3% 0.8%
MEAN 75.70 80.11 89.33 81.90 66.13 83.43 146.88 65.37
Comparison Groups: BCDEFGH
Independent Z-Test for Percentages
Upper case letters indicate significance at the 98% level.
Copyright (c) 2002 Marvin Longabaugh
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Table 15 - Federal Circuit
Confirmation Days
Circuit Court Judges
-------------------------------FEDERAL CIRCUIT--------------------------------------------
TOTAL 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th DC Fed
------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) (K) (L) (M) (N)
362 13 33 32 25 50 34 24 24 57 20 10 26 14
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
60 & Under 192 6 18 17 15 30 18 17 17 21 11 3 13 6
53.0% 46.2% 54.5% 53.1% 60.0% 60.0% 52.9% 70.8% 70.8% 36.8% 55.0% 30.0% 50.0% 42.9%
J JL JL
61-120 Days 109 6 8 9 7 16 11 5 3 19 6 4 11 4
30.1% 46.2% 24.2% 28.1% 28.0% 32.0% 32.4% 20.8% 12.5% 33.3% 30.0% 40.0% 42.3% 28.6%
I
121-180 Days 29 1 2 4 2 3 3 2 1 5 2 1 1 2
8.0% 7.7% 6.1% 12.5% 8.0% 6.0% 8.8% 8.3% 4.2% 8.8% 10.0% 10.0% 3.8% 14.3%
181-240 Days 19 - 4 - 1 - 2 - 2 5 1 2 1 1
5.2% 12.1% 4.0% 5.9% 8.3% 8.8% 5.0% 20.0% 3.8% 7.1%
BDFH
241-300 Days 5 - - 1 - 1 - - - 3 - - - -
1.4% 3.1% 2.0% 5.3%
301-365 Days 2 - - 1 - - - - 1 - - - - -
0.6% 3.1% 4.2%
Over 1 Year 6 - 1 - - - - - - 4 - - - 1
1.7% 3.0% 7.0% 7.1%
MEAN 75.70 54.31 87.27 71.03 54.08 56.28 73.56 47.88 64.83 116.81 61.50 108.20 63.04 111.79
Comparison Groups: BCDEFGHIJKLMN
Independent Z-Test for Percentages
Upper case letters indicate significance at the 98% level.
Copyright (c) 2002 Marvin Longabaugh
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Table 16 - Congress 1961-1984
Confirmation Days
Circuit Court Judges
--------------------------------------------CONGRESS-------------------------------------------
1961-62 1963-64 1965-66 1967-68 1969-70 1971-72 1973-74 1975-76 1977-78 1979-80 1981-82 1983-84
TOTAL 87th 88th 89th 90th 91st 92nd 93rd 94th 95th 96th 97th 98th
------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- -------
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) (K) (L) (M)
362 17 7 25 12 20 17 10 9 12 44 19 14
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
60 & Under 192 16 5 24 9 14 14 10 7 11 12 16 9
53.0% 94.1% 71.4% 96.0% 75.0% 70.0% 82.4% 100.0% 77.8% 91.7% 27.3% 84.2% 64.3%
K K FKM K K K FKM K K K K
61-120 Days 109 - 2 1 2 5 3 - 2 1 26 3 4
30.1% 28.6% 4.0% 16.7% 25.0% 17.6% 22.2% 8.3% 59.1% 15.8% 28.6%
BH EFGHIJL BH
BD
121-180 Days 29 - - - 1 1 - - - - 4 - -
8.0% 8.3% 5.0% 9.1%
181-240 Days 19 1 - - - - - - - - 1 - 1
5.2% 5.9% 2.3% 7.1%
241-300 Days 5 - - - - - - - - - 1 - -
1.4% 2.3%
301-365 Days 2 - - - - - - - - - - - -
0.6%
Over 1 Year 6 - - - - - - - - - - - -
1.7%
MEAN 75.70 30.88 45.71 26.20 45.08 40.50 28.65 19.60 36.56 32.58 82.43 34.05 46.21
Comparison Groups: BCDEFGHIJKLM
Independent Z-Test for Percentages
Upper case letters indicate significance at the 98% level.
Copyright (c) 2002 Marvin Longabaugh
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Table 17 - Congress Since 1985
Confirmation Days
Circuit Court Judges
----------------------------------------CONGRESS---------------------------------------
1985-1986 1987-1988 1989-1990 1991-1992 1993-1994 1995-1996 1997-1998 1999-2000
TOTAL 99th 100th 101st 102nd 103rd 104th 105th 106th
---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I)
362 33 16 22 20 19 11 20 15
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
60 & Under 192 23 4 6 6 2 2 1 1
53.0% 69.7% 25.0% 27.3% 30.0% 10.5% 18.2% 5.0% 6.7%
CDEFGHI
61-120 Days 109 8 4 15 6 12 5 7 3
30.1% 24.2% 25.0% 68.2% 30.0% 63.2% 45.5% 35.0% 20.0%
BCEI BCI
121-180 Days 29 2 5 1 5 4 2 1 3
8.0% 6.1% 31.2% 4.5% 25.0% 21.1% 18.2% 5.0% 20.0%
181-240 Days 19 - 3 - 3 1 - 7 2
5.2% 18.8% 15.0% 5.3% 35.0% 13.3%
BDFG
241-300 Days 5 - - - - - 2 1 1
1.4% 18.2% 5.0% 6.7%
301-365 Days 2 - - - - - - - 2
0.6% 13.3%
Over 1 Year 6 - - - - - - 3 3
1.7% 15.0% 20.0%
MEAN 75.70 49.61 118.81 77.77 107.35 103.16 125.18 204.70 226.87
Comparison Groups: BCDEFGHI
Independent Z-Test for Percentages
Upper case letters indicate significance at the 98% level.
Copyright (c) 2002 Marvin Longabaugh
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Table 18 - Political Party - President/Senate
Confirmation Days
Circuit Court Judges
-----DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENT----- -----REPUBLICAN PRESIDENT----- -----------SENATE LEADERSHIP-----------
----------------------------SENATE--------------------------- Majority Majority Minority Minority
TOTAL Democrat Republican Other Democrat Republican Other Leader Whip Leader Whip
--------- --------- ---------- --------- --------- ---------- --------- --------- --------- --------- ---------
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) (K)
362 136 46 - 114 66 - 33 46 27 47
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
60 & Under 192 79 4 - 61 48 - 20 25 11 20
53.0% 58.1% 8.7% 53.5% 72.7% 60.6% 54.3% 40.7% 42.6%
C C CE
61-120 Days 109 44 15 - 35 15 - 11 16 8 13
30.1% 32.4% 32.6% 30.7% 22.7% 33.3% 34.8% 29.6% 27.7%
121-180 Days 29 9 6 - 12 2 - 2 2 3 6
8.0% 6.6% 13.0% 10.5% 3.0% 6.1% 4.3% 11.1% 12.8%
181-240 Days 19 3 9 - 6 1 - - 1 4 4
5.2% 2.2% 19.6% 5.3% 1.5% 2.2% 14.8% 8.5%
BF
241-300 Days 5 1 4 - - - - - 2 - 2
1.4% 0.7% 8.7% 4.3% 4.3%
301-365 Days 2 - 2 - - - - - - 1 -
0.6% 4.3% 3.7%
Over 1 Year 6 - 6 - - - - - - - 2
1.7% 13.0% 4.3%
BEF
MEAN 75.70 58.96 192.91 - 66.50 44.41 - 48.70 65.24 86.81 100.68
Comparison Groups: BCDEFG/HIJK
Independent Z-Test for Percentages
Upper case letters indicate significance at the 98% level.
Copyright (c) 2002 Marvin Longabaugh
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Table 19 - Year of President's Term
Confirmation Days
Circuit Court Judges
-----------------TERM YEAR-----------------
TOTAL 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
362 91 106 98 67
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
60 & Under 192 64 59 41 28
53.0% 70.3% 55.7% 41.8% 41.8%
DE
61-120 Days 109 22 30 40 17
30.1% 24.2% 28.3% 40.8% 25.4%
B
121-180 Days 29 2 7 12 8
8.0% 2.2% 6.6% 12.2% 11.9%
B
181-240 Days 19 2 7 3 7
5.2% 2.2% 6.6% 3.1% 10.4%
241-300 Days 5 1 - 2 2
1.4% 1.1% 2.0% 3.0%
301-365 Days 2 - - - 2
0.6% 3.0%
Over 1 Year 6 - 3 - 3
1.7% 2.8% 4.5%
MEAN 75.70 46.41 79.27 77.40 107.37
Comparison Groups: BCDE
Independent Z-Test for Percentages
Upper case letters indicate significance at the 98% level.
Copyright (c) 2002 Marvin Longabaugh
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Table 20 - Presidential Term
Confirmation Days
Circuit Court Judges
---------------------------------------PRESIDENTIAL TERM---------------------------------------
Johnson Johnson Nixon Nixon Reagan Reagan GHW Clinton Clinton
TOTAL Kennedy 1st 2nd 1st 2nd Ford Carter 1st 2nd Bush 1st 2nd
------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- -------
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) (K) (L) (M)
362 20 4 37 37 8 11 56 33 49 42 30 35
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
60 & Under 192 19 2 33 28 8 9 23 25 27 12 4 2
53.0% 95.0% 50.0% 89.2% 75.7% 100.0% 81.8% 41.1% 75.8% 55.1% 28.6% 13.3% 5.7%
HJKLM HJKLM HKLM EHIJKLM HKLM LM HKLM KLM M
61-120 Days 109 - 2 3 8 - 2 27 7 12 21 17 10
30.1% 50.0% 8.1% 21.6% 18.2% 48.2% 21.2% 24.5% 50.0% 56.7% 28.6%
BF BDEFIJ BF BF BDEFIJ DEFGIJM BF
B
121-180 Days 29 - - 1 1 - - 4 - 7 6 6 4
8.0% 2.7% 2.7% 7.1% 14.3% 14.3% 20.0% 11.4%
BCFGI BCFGI BCFGI
181-240 Days 19 1 - - - - - 1 1 3 3 1 9
5.2% 5.0% 1.8% 3.0% 6.1% 7.1% 3.3% 25.7%
EFGHIJL
BCD
241-300 Days 5 - - - - - - 1 - - - 2 2
1.4% 1.8% 6.7% 5.7%
301-365 Days 2 - - - - - - - - - - - 2
0.6% 5.7%
Over 1 Year 6 - - - - - - - - - - - 6
1.7% 17.1%
FGHIJKL
BCDE
MEAN 75.70 31.45 54.00 32.32 35.05 22.38 31.45 71.75 39.21 72.20 91.86 111.23 214.20
Comparison Groups: BCDEFGHIJKLM
Independent Z-Test for Percentages
Upper case letters indicate significance at the 98% level.
Copyright (c) 2002 Marvin Longabaugh
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Table 21 - Gender/Age/Ethnic
Confirmation Days
District Court Judges
---GENDER---- -----------AGE AT CONFIRMATION----------- -----------ETHNIC ORIGIN----------
Under Over Afr Asian Native
TOTAL Male Female 40 41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60 60 Cauc Amer Hisp Amer Amer
------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) (K) (L) (M) (N)
614 484 130 48 142 160 136 95 33 510 68 30 5 1
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
60 & Under 211 174 37 28 49 35 45 36 18 182 24 5 - -
34.4% 36.0% 28.5% 58.3% 34.5% 21.9% 33.1% 37.9% 54.5% 35.7% 35.3% 16.7%
EFGH F F F LMN MN MN
61-120 Days 223 175 48 10 56 61 52 36 8 181 25 14 2 1
36.3% 36.2% 36.9% 20.8% 39.4% 38.1% 38.2% 37.9% 24.2% 35.5% 36.8% 46.7% 40.0% 100.0%
D D D JKLM
121-180 Days 107 88 19 8 26 29 27 13 4 88 11 7 1 -
17.4% 18.2% 14.6% 16.7% 18.3% 18.1% 19.9% 13.7% 12.1% 17.3% 16.2% 23.3% 20.0%
N N N
181-240 Days 43 33 10 1 9 18 7 5 3 36 4 2 1 -
7.0% 6.8% 7.7% 2.1% 6.3% 11.2% 5.1% 5.3% 9.1% 7.1% 5.9% 6.7% 20.0%
D N
241-300 Days 14 8 6 1 1 6 4 2 - 13 - 1 - -
2.3% 1.7% 4.6% 2.1% 0.7% 3.8% 2.9% 2.1% 2.5% 3.3%
I KMN
301-365 Days 9 2 7 - 1 5 1 2 - 6 2 1 - -
1.5% 0.4% 5.4% 0.7% 3.1% 0.7% 2.1% 1.2% 2.9% 3.3%
B MN
Over 1 Year 7 4 3 - - 6 - 1 - 4 2 - 1 -
1.1% 0.8% 2.3% 3.8% 1.1% 0.8% 2.9% 20.0%
DEGI
MEAN 101.36 96.27 120.30 74.42 91.62 129.61 96.07 97.63 78.06 99.42 101.99 114.70 213.20 91.00
Comparison Groups: BC/DEFGHI/JKLMN
Independent Z-Test for Percentages
Upper case letters indicate significance at the 98% level.
Copyright (c) 2002 Marvin Longabaugh
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Table 22 - Law School Ranking
Confirmation Days
District Court Judges
TOTAL Top 10 11-25 26-50 2nd Tier 3rd Tier 4th Tier Other
---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H)
614 164 106 91 137 78 32 6
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
60 & Under 211 46 40 37 49 25 13 1
34.4% 28.0% 37.7% 40.7% 35.8% 32.1% 40.6% 16.7%
61-120 Days 223 69 36 24 50 29 10 5
36.3% 42.1% 34.0% 26.4% 36.5% 37.2% 31.2% 83.3%
D BCDEFG
121-180 Days 107 27 18 27 20 11 4 -
17.4% 16.5% 17.0% 29.7% 14.6% 14.1% 12.5%
H H BEFH H H
181-240 Days 43 11 9 3 10 7 3 -
7.0% 6.7% 8.5% 3.3% 7.3% 9.0% 9.4%
H H H H
241-300 Days 14 5 1 - 4 3 1 -
2.3% 3.0% 0.9% 2.9% 3.8% 3.1%
301-365 Days 9 3 1 - 3 2 - -
1.5% 1.8% 0.9% 2.2% 2.6%
Over 1 Year 7 3 1 - 1 1 1 -
1.1% 1.8% 0.9% 0.7% 1.3% 3.1%
MEAN 101.36 108.18 99.47 89.21 101.28 107.31 97.72 76.50
Comparison Groups: BCDEFGH
Independent Z-Test for Percentages
Upper case letters indicate significance at the 98% level.
Copyright (c) 2002 Marvin Longabaugh
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Table 24 - College Ranking
Confirmation Days
District Court Judges
TOTAL Top 10 11-25 26-50 2nd Tier 3rd Tier 4th Tier Other
---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H)
614 89 60 44 122 54 23 222
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
60 & Under 211 27 16 20 47 15 8 78
34.4% 30.3% 26.7% 45.5% 38.5% 27.8% 34.8% 35.1%
61-120 Days 223 32 24 14 45 22 5 81
36.3% 36.0% 40.0% 31.8% 36.9% 40.7% 21.7% 36.5%
121-180 Days 107 19 12 5 19 11 3 38
17.4% 21.3% 20.0% 11.4% 15.6% 20.4% 13.0% 17.1%
181-240 Days 43 7 5 4 6 2 4 15
7.0% 7.9% 8.3% 9.1% 4.9% 3.7% 17.4% 6.8%
241-300 Days 14 3 2 1 2 1 3 2
2.3% 3.4% 3.3% 2.3% 1.6% 1.9% 13.0% 0.9%
301-365 Days 9 1 1 - 1 1 - 5
1.5% 1.1% 1.7% 0.8% 1.9% 2.3%
Over 1 Year 7 - - - 2 2 - 3
1.1% 1.6% 3.7% 1.4%
MEAN 101.36 104.13 109.55 88.39 96.54 110.74 119.39 99.11
Comparison Groups: BCDEFGH
Independent Z-Test for Percentages
Upper case letters indicate significance at the 98% level.
Copyright (c) 2002 Marvin Longabaugh
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Table 26 - Federal Circuit
Confirmation Days
District Court Judges
-------------------------------FEDERAL CIRCUIT--------------------------------------------
TOTAL 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th DC Fed
------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) (K) (L) (M) (N)
614 25 72 58 47 61 58 44 45 100 32 59 13 -
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
60 & Under 211 14 23 17 15 18 19 15 18 30 13 27 2 -
34.4% 56.0% 31.9% 29.3% 31.9% 29.5% 32.8% 34.1% 40.0% 30.0% 40.6% 45.8% 15.4%
JM M
61-120 Days 223 7 29 26 19 27 17 18 10 34 14 15 7 -
36.3% 28.0% 40.3% 44.8% 40.4% 44.3% 29.3% 40.9% 22.2% 34.0% 43.8% 25.4% 53.8%
I I
121-180 Days 107 4 13 9 9 10 13 3 12 19 3 11 1 -
17.4% 16.0% 18.1% 15.5% 19.1% 16.4% 22.4% 6.8% 26.7% 19.0% 9.4% 18.6% 7.7%
H H
181-240 Days 43 - 5 4 2 3 4 5 2 11 1 4 2 -
7.0% 6.9% 6.9% 4.3% 4.9% 6.9% 11.4% 4.4% 11.0% 3.1% 6.8% 15.4%
B B
241-300 Days 14 - 2 - - - 2 2 3 2 1 1 1 -
2.3% 2.8% 3.4% 4.5% 6.7% 2.0% 3.1% 1.7% 7.7%
301-365 Days 9 - - 2 - 2 2 1 - 1 - 1 - -
1.5% 3.4% 3.3% 3.4% 2.3% 1.0% 1.7%
Over 1 Year 7 - - - 2 1 1 - - 3 - - - -
1.1% 4.3% 1.6% 1.7% 3.0%
MEAN 101.36 67.24 95.47 99.98 102.06 104.64 118.26 101.11 100.02 113.38 81.66 92.44 114.46 -
Comparison Groups: BCDEFGHIJKLMN
Independent Z-Test for Percentages
Upper case letters indicate significance at the 98% level.
Copyright (c) 2002 Marvin Longabaugh
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Table 27 - Congress Since 1985
Confirmation Days
District Court Judges
----------------------------------------CONGRESS---------------------------------------
1985-1986 1987-1988 1989-1990 1991-1992 1993-1994 1995-1996 1997-1998 1999-2000
TOTAL 99th 100th 101st 102nd 103rd 104th 105th 106th
---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I)
614 95 66 48 100 107 62 79 57
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
60 & Under 211 82 8 17 28 44 13 7 12
34.4% 86.3% 12.1% 35.4% 28.0% 41.1% 21.0% 8.9% 21.1%
CDEFGHI CH CH CGHI
61-120 Days 223 12 34 27 29 53 25 24 19
36.3% 12.6% 51.5% 56.2% 29.0% 49.5% 40.3% 30.4% 33.3%
BEH BEHI B BEH B B B
121-180 Days 107 - 16 3 30 9 14 22 13
17.4% 24.2% 6.2% 30.0% 8.4% 22.6% 27.8% 22.8%
BDF BDF B BDF BDF BDF
181-240 Days 43 - 5 1 9 - 7 13 8
7.0% 7.6% 2.1% 9.0% 11.3% 16.5% 14.0%
BF BF BF BDF BDF
241-300 Days 14 1 - - 2 - 3 5 3
2.3% 1.1% 2.0% 4.8% 6.3% 5.3%
301-365 Days 9 - 1 - 2 - - 4 2
1.5% 1.5% 2.0% 5.1% 3.5%
Over 1 Year 7 - 2 - - 1 - 4 -
1.1% 3.0% 0.9% 5.1%
MEAN 101.36 42.74 120.59 76.79 112.04 76.37 112.27 161.05 131.07
Comparison Groups: BCDEFGHI
Independent Z-Test for Percentages
Upper case letters indicate significance at the 98% level.
Copyright (c) 2002 Marvin Longabaugh
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Table 28 - Political Party - President/Senate
Confirmation Days
District Court Judges
-----DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENT----- -----REPUBLICAN PRESIDENT----- -----------SENATE LEADERSHIP-----------
----------------------------SENATE--------------------------- Majority Majority Minority Minority
TOTAL Democrat Republican Other Democrat Republican Other Leader Whip Leader Whip
--------- --------- ---------- --------- --------- ---------- --------- --------- --------- --------- ---------
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) (K)
614 107 198 - 214 95 - 4 12 6 11
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
60 & Under 211 44 32 - 53 82 - 2 7 1 9
34.4% 41.1% 16.2% 24.8% 86.3% 50.0% 58.3% 16.7% 81.8%
CE BCE J
61-120 Days 223 53 68 - 90 12 - 2 4 5 2
36.3% 49.5% 34.3% 42.1% 12.6% 50.0% 33.3% 83.3% 18.2%
CF F F IK
121-180 Days 107 9 49 - 49 - - - 1 - -
17.4% 8.4% 24.7% 22.9% 8.3%
F BF BF
181-240 Days 43 - 28 - 15 - - - - - -
7.0% 14.1% 7.0%
BEF BF
241-300 Days 14 - 11 - 2 1 - - - - -
2.3% 5.6% 0.9% 1.1%
BEF
301-365 Days 9 - 6 - 3 - - - - - -
1.5% 3.0% 1.4%
BF
Over 1 Year 7 1 4 - 2 - - - - - -
1.1% 0.9% 2.0% 0.9%
MEAN 101.36 76.37 137.15 - 106.77 42.74 - 69.00 69.00 88.67 47.73
Comparison Groups: BCDEFG/HIJK
Independent Z-Test for Percentages
Upper case letters indicate significance at the 98% level.
Copyright (c) 2002 Marvin Longabaugh
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Table 29 - Year of President's Term
Confirmation Days
District Court Judges
-----------------TERM YEAR-----------------
TOTAL 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
614 126 204 148 136
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
60 & Under 211 76 75 37 23
34.4% 60.3% 36.8% 25.0% 16.9%
CDE DE
61-120 Days 223 38 78 69 38
36.3% 30.2% 38.2% 46.6% 27.9%
BE
121-180 Days 107 6 28 32 41
17.4% 4.8% 13.7% 21.6% 30.1%
B B BC
181-240 Days 43 2 12 9 20
7.0% 1.6% 5.9% 6.1% 14.7%
BCD
241-300 Days 14 3 3 1 7
2.3% 2.4% 1.5% 0.7% 5.1%
301-365 Days 9 1 3 - 5
1.5% 0.8% 1.5% 3.7%
Over 1 Year 7 - 5 - 2
1.1% 2.5% 1.5%
MEAN 101.36 66.17 99.82 99.37 138.44
Comparison Groups: BCDE
Independent Z-Test for Percentages
Upper case letters indicate significance at the 98% level.
Copyright (c) 2002 Marvin Longabaugh
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Table 30 - Presidential Term
Confirmation Days
District Court Judges
-------------PRESIDENTIAL TERM-------------
Reagan Clinton Clinton
TOTAL 2nd GHW Bush 1st 2nd
---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
614 161 148 169 136
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
60 & Under 211 90 45 57 19
34.4% 55.9% 30.4% 33.7% 14.0%
CDE E E
61-120 Days 223 46 56 78 43
36.3% 28.6% 37.8% 46.2% 31.6%
BE
121-180 Days 107 16 33 23 35
17.4% 9.9% 22.3% 13.6% 25.7%
B BD
181-240 Days 43 5 10 7 21
7.0% 3.1% 6.8% 4.1% 15.4%
BCD
241-300 Days 14 1 2 3 8
2.3% 0.6% 1.4% 1.8% 5.9%
B
301-365 Days 9 1 2 - 6
1.5% 0.6% 1.4% 4.4%
D
Over 1 Year 7 2 - 1 4
1.1% 1.2% 0.6% 2.9%
MEAN 101.36 74.65 100.61 89.54 148.49
Comparison Groups: BCDE
Independent Z-Test for Percentages
Upper case letters indicate significance at the 98% level.
Copyright (c) 2002 Marvin Longabaugh
